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KeiSeiKit-1.0/_blocks/auth-passkeys.md
Parfii-bot 0be354a920 KeiSeiKit-public — clean state 
Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells,
project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks.

Contents:
- 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/)
- 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/)
- 67 user-invocable skills (skills/)
- 33 hooks (hooks/)
- Composition blocks (_blocks/)
- Documentation (docs/, README.md)
- TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/)
- Assembler (_assembler/)
- Roles (_roles/)
- Templates (_templates/)
- Forgejo CI (.forgejo/)

Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info>

License: see LICENSE.
2026-05-01 12:09:03 +08:00

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AUTH — Passkeys (WebAuthn / FIDO2)

Phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication via public-key credentials bound to the Relying Party. For federated login see auth-oauth2-oidc.md; for session issuance after passkey assertion see auth-sessions.md.

When to include

  • Greenfield auth: passkeys as PRIMARY login (password-optional or password-less).
  • Existing password login: passkeys as stronger step-up or second factor that also replaces the password.
  • Any consumer product — Apple, Google, Microsoft all ship platform authenticators (Touch ID / Face ID / Windows Hello) and sync passkeys across devices via iCloud Keychain / Google Password Manager / Microsoft Authenticator as of 2024–2026.

What it declares

  • Two ceremonies:
    • Registration — server sends PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions (random challenge, rp.id, rp.name, user.id opaque, pubKeyCredParams prefer ES256=-7 and RS256=-257, authenticatorSelection, attestation: "none" unless regulated). Client returns attestationObject + clientDataJSON. Server verifies and stores credentialID, publicKey, signCount, transports, backupEligible, backupState.
    • Assertion (login) — server sends PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions (fresh random challenge, rpId, allowCredentials list or empty for discoverable). Client returns signature + authenticatorData + clientDataJSON. Server verifies signature with stored publicKey, checks signCount strictly > stored, origin, rpId hash.
  • RP ID = eTLD+1 or a subdomain of it (example.com covers app.example.com; a passkey for app.example.com does NOT work on example.com). Pick RP ID carefully at launch — changing it invalidates every existing credential.
  • Resident / discoverable credentials (residentKey: "required" + userVerification: "required") enable username-less login ("Sign in" button with no email field). Requires passkey-capable authenticator.
  • Platform vs cross-platform: authenticatorAttachment: "platform" = Touch ID / Face ID / Windows Hello (synced, convenient). "cross-platform" = roaming security keys (YubiKey, Titan). Leave unset to accept both.
  • Challenge: 16+ random bytes per ceremony, single-use, time-boxed (≤5 min), bound to server session, rejected on replay.
  • Libraries: SimpleWebAuthn (TS — reference implementation, covers both server + browser), webauthn-rs (Rust, Webauthn builder + passkey feature), fido2-rs (low-level), py_webauthn (Python). NEVER roll CBOR / COSE parsing by hand.
  • Recovery path REQUIRED before enabling passkey-only — lose device, lose account. Ship at least one of: email magic-link fallback, passkey backup codes, OAuth federation as recovery. User opts out of recovery only after explicit warning.

References

  • W3C WebAuthn Level 3 (2024-ready), FIDO2 CTAP 2.1, passkeys.dev [E1 — W3C/FIDO specs].
  • auth-sessions.md for cookie issuance after verifyAuthenticationResponse succeeds.
  • Evidence grade [E2] — Apple/Google/Microsoft production since 2023–2024; SimpleWebAuthn 10.x stable.