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KeiSeiKit-1.0/_blocks/auth-oauth2-oidc.md
Parfii-bot 0be354a920 KeiSeiKit-public — clean state 
Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells,
project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks.

Contents:
- 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/)
- 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/)
- 67 user-invocable skills (skills/)
- 33 hooks (hooks/)
- Composition blocks (_blocks/)
- Documentation (docs/, README.md)
- TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/)
- Assembler (_assembler/)
- Roles (_roles/)
- Templates (_templates/)
- Forgejo CI (.forgejo/)

Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info>

License: see LICENSE.
2026-05-01 12:09:03 +08:00

2.7 KiB
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AUTH — OAuth2 + OIDC (Authorization Code + PKCE)

Identity delegation to external providers (Google / GitHub / Apple / Microsoft / any OIDC-compliant IdP). For first-party login see auth-passkeys.md / auth-sessions.md; for post-login permissions see auth-authorization.md.

When to include

  • App supports "Sign in with Google / GitHub / Apple / Microsoft" or federates to an enterprise OIDC IdP (Okta, Auth0, Keycloak, Entra ID).
  • App needs a short-lived API access token for the user (Gmail, Calendar, GitHub API).
  • Regulated context where the IdP — not the app — is the system of record for identity.

What it declares

  • Flow: Authorization Code + PKCE for EVERY client (public SPA, mobile, confidential server). PKCE is mandatory in OAuth 2.1 and removes the implicit flow entirely.
  • PKCE params: code_verifier 43–128 chars random, code_challenge = BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)), code_challenge_method=S256. Never plain.
  • State + nonce: state (CSRF, 32+ bytes random, bound to session) on every auth request; nonce (replay, in ID token claim) for OIDC. Reject response if either mismatches.
  • Redirect URIs: exact-match, pre-registered at the IdP. No wildcards. localhost and custom schemes OK for native; HTTPS required for web.
  • Providers: Google (accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration), GitHub (OAuth2 only, no OIDC discovery — hard-code https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize, token, https://api.github.com/user), Apple (OIDC, but only returns user name/email on FIRST consent — persist on first login or lose it), Microsoft (login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration).
  • Token handling: access_token short-lived (≤1 h), kept server-side only. refresh_token rotated on every use (RFC 6749 §6 + OAuth 2.1), stored encrypted at rest, NEVER sent to the browser. id_token validated (JWKS signature + iss + aud + exp + nonce) and discarded — do NOT re-use as a session token.
  • Secrets: CLIENT_ID + CLIENT_SECRET per provider in secrets/*.env; referenced by env var name only. Public clients (SPA/mobile) use PKCE WITHOUT a secret.
  • Libraries: prefer Better-Auth (TS), NextAuth/Auth.js (Next.js), authlib (Python), openidconnect-rs or oauth2-rs (Rust). Avoid rolling your own — every major CVE in this space is custom code.

References

  • RFC 6749 (OAuth 2.0), RFC 7636 (PKCE), RFC 9700 (OAuth 2.0 Security BCP, 2024), OAuth 2.1 draft, OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [E1 — standards-track RFCs].
  • auth-sessions.md for what to do AFTER the IdP handshake returns.
  • Evidence grade [E2] — implementation widely deployed, spec stable since 2024.