KeiSeiKit-1.0/_blocks/ci-security-gate.md
Parfii-bot 0be354a920 KeiSeiKit-public — clean state
Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells,
project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks.

Contents:
- 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/)
- 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/)
- 67 user-invocable skills (skills/)
- 33 hooks (hooks/)
- Composition blocks (_blocks/)
- Documentation (docs/, README.md)
- TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/)
- Assembler (_assembler/)
- Roles (_roles/)
- Templates (_templates/)
- Forgejo CI (.forgejo/)

Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info>

License: see LICENSE.
2026-05-01 12:09:03 +08:00

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# CI — Security gate (secrets, SCA, SBOM, semgrep, licenses)
Every PR passes through this gate before merge. Every scheduled run re-scans `main`. Pair with `ci-github-actions.md` / `ci-forgejo-actions.md` (the shell) and RULE 0.8 (secrets SSoT) / () — the gate enforces both.
## Scanner set (one job each, matrix is fine)
| Concern | Tool | Trigger | Fail threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leaked secrets | gitleaks [VERIFIED: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks] | PR + push | any finding |
| Rust SCA | cargo-audit [VERIFIED: https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec] | PR + cron daily | any `Vulnerability` |
| Node SCA | `npm audit` / `pnpm audit` (native) | PR + cron | `high` and above |
| Python SCA | pip-audit [VERIFIED: https://github.com/pypa/pip-audit] | PR + cron | any CVE |
| SBOM generation | syft [VERIFIED: https://github.com/anchore/syft] | release only | CycloneDX JSON as artefact |
| SAST / patterns | semgrep [VERIFIED: https://github.com/semgrep/semgrep] | PR | any `ERROR` severity |
| License policy | cargo-deny [VERIFIED: https://github.com/EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny] (Rust) / license-checker (JS) | PR | disallowed SPDX ID |
## gitleaks — secrets scan (always first)
Runs before any build step so that a detected secret aborts the job without ever shipping a binary that used it.
```yaml
- uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2 # [VERIFIED: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks-action]
env:
GITLEAKS_LICENSE: ${{ secrets.GITLEAKS_LICENSE }} # orgs only; free for ≤25 users
```
Custom rules in `.gitleaks.toml` at repo root — mirror the patterns from `~/.claude/rules/secrets-single-source.md` (sk-, ghp_, sk-ant-, Telegram bot, AWS access key, etc.). Any hit FAILS the run. No "informational" severity for secrets.
## cargo-audit / pip-audit / npm audit
Daily cron to catch CVEs published after merge. Fail-fast on HIGH/CRITICAL; report MEDIUM to a tracking issue rather than blocking the PR.
```yaml
- run: cargo audit --deny warnings --deny unmaintained --deny yanked
```
Pin the advisory-DB commit in vendored copies; upstream can get taken down.
## SBOM via syft
Generate CycloneDX JSON for every published artefact. Attach to the GitHub Release (see `ci-release-automation.md`) and to the container image as an OCI annotation.
```yaml
- uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0 # [VERIFIED: https://github.com/anchore/sbom-action]
with:
format: cyclonedx-json
artifact-name: sbom.cdx.json
```
SLSA provenance (`slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator`) is an optional upgrade; required when shipping to any customer under a supply-chain contract.
## semgrep — SAST
`p/default` + `p/secrets` + `p/owasp-top-ten` + any language pack relevant to the repo. Custom rules under `.semgrep/*.yaml` for project-specific patterns (e.g. "no `unwrap()` in request handlers").
```yaml
- uses: semgrep/semgrep-action@v1 # [VERIFIED: https://github.com/semgrep/semgrep-action]
env:
SEMGREP_RULES: p/default p/secrets p/owasp-top-ten
```
## License policy
`cargo-deny` `deny.toml` declares allowed SPDX identifiers (`MIT`, `Apache-2.0`, `BSD-3-Clause`, `ISC`, `Unicode-DFS-2016`). Anything else FAILS the PR. GPL / AGPL / SSPL in a commercial repo = hard stop. For JS, `license-checker --failOn 'GPL;AGPL;SSPL'`.
## Scheduling
```yaml
on:
pull_request:
push: { branches: [main] }
schedule:
- cron: "17 3 * * *" # daily 03:17 UTC — off-hour, avoids global burst
```
## Forbidden
- Running the security gate AFTER build/test (secret must block before the secret-using binary exists)
- Allowing "informational" severity on secrets scans (gitleaks = binary; 0 or 1)
- Skipping `cargo-audit` / `pip-audit` on release workflows (a CVE published yesterday ships today without it)
- Uploading SBOM to a public artefact store from a RULE-0.1 repo (internal artefact store only)
- Copy-pasting a secret detected by gitleaks into the chat to "discuss" — rotate at provider FIRST, then discuss