KeiSeiKit-1.0/docs/encyclopedia/cross-cli-policy.md
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feat(v0.41): patch 5 Gemini security findings + Copilot doc bug + claude/grok perms
Audit pass via Phase C dogfooding (security-auditor @ Agy/Gemini reviewing
our own safe_tools.rs) surfaced 5 real bugs. All fixed.

## Gemini findings (5 real bugs)

[#1 HIGH] FAIL-OPEN on missing config/hook
  Before: missing policy-chain.toml → "passing through" warning; missing
          hook script → "skipped" warning. Misconfig silently disabled
          enforcement.
  After:  both paths FAIL-CLOSED with clear error surfaced to caller.
          Tests/dev can opt in to pass-through via KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1.

[#2 HIGH] Path traversal in kei_edit/kei_write
  Before: no validation; attacker could pass file_path=/etc/passwd or
          $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys.
  After:  validate_path() rejects '..' segments, system dirs (/etc/, /usr/,
          /System/, /var/, /root/), and dotfile-secret dirs (~/.ssh/,
          ~/.aws/, ~/.gnupg/, ~/.config/gcloud/). Override via
          KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS for explicit single-root confinement.

[#3 HIGH] CLAUDECODE/GROKCODE env bypass
  Behavior unchanged — this guard is a perf/UX optimization to avoid
  double-firing hooks when called from inside Claude/Grok (which already
  ran their own PreToolUse). Documented explicitly as NOT a security
  boundary: attacker controlling parent env already owns the invocation.
  Module header gains a DESIGN NOTE making this load-bearing.

[#4 MED] std::fs in async context
  Before: handle_edit/handle_write used std::fs::{read_to_string,write},
          which block the tokio worker thread. Pathological paths like
          /dev/random would freeze a worker indefinitely.
  After:  tokio::fs::{read_to_string,write}.await — async I/O, worker
          stays responsive.

[#5 MED] kill_on_drop only kills immediate child
  Before: timeout in kei_bash drops the Child handle; tokio's kill_on_drop
          SIGKILLs only the shell. Grandchildren (e.g., 'sleep 1000 &')
          orphaned.
  After:  Unix-only: spawn child in its own process group
          (Command::process_group(0)), and on timeout libc::kill(-pid,
          SIGKILL) to take down the whole group. New libc dep on Unix.

## Copilot doc fix

Doc claimed "kei-mcp exposes 4 built-in tools" without saying spawn_agent
lives in tools.rs while kei_bash/edit/write live in safe_tools.rs.
Validator agent flagged this as FALSE/MISLEADING. Now the doc spells out
the two-file structure + adds a v0.41 hardening summary.

## claude/grok subprocess permissions

Cross-CLI audit demo revealed that 'claude -p' and 'grok --print' returned
empty when invoked headless with a real audit task — they need explicit
permission flags to use Read/Grep tools in non-interactive mode. Added:

  claude:  --permission-mode=bypassPermissions
  grok:    --always-approve
  agy:     --dangerously-skip-permissions

Override via KEI_AGENT_PERMISSIVE=0 to keep strict default.
Re-verified: claude+grok both echo SMOKE-OK-V41 with the flag.

## Verification

cargo test -p kei-mcp --release  → 3/3 pass
MCP JSON-RPC smoke (all 7):
  - tools/list shows 4 built-ins ✓
  - kei_bash blocks RULE 0.1 push ✓
  - kei_bash passes 'echo OK' ✓
  - kei_write rejects /etc/passwd ✓
  - kei_write rejects ../ traversal ✓
  - kei_write rejects ~/.ssh/* ✓
  - missing policy-chain → FAIL-CLOSED with clear error ✓
  - KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 → opt-in pass-through ✓
2026-05-26 19:48:29 +08:00

7 KiB

Cross-CLI policy enforcement

Same safety rules. Any LLM CLI. Three honesty tiers.

KeiSeiKit's safety hooks (no-github-push, safety-guard, destructive-guard, citation-verify, numeric-claims-guard) originally fired only inside Claude Code's PreToolUse pipeline. Phase C extends enforcement to other CLIs — but the strength of enforcement depends on what each CLI permits.

The 3-tier honesty model

Tier What it means CLIs
TIER 1 — full native Tool-call enforcement at the CLI's own hook layer. Same as Claude. claude, grok
TIER 2 — MCP-wrapped Native shell disabled at launch; agent forced to use our policy-gated kei_bash/kei_edit/kei_write MCP tools. copilot
TIER 3 — advisory CLI can't disable native shell; we register kei-mcp and instruct the agent to prefer kei_* tools, but enforcement is prompt-level only. agy, kimi

For patent-sensitive or production-PR work — stick to TIER 1 (claude or grok).

How to wire

One command sets up enforcement for whichever CLIs you have installed:

kei mcp-wire                    # detect + wire all installed CLIs
kei mcp-wire grok               # wire one CLI
kei mcp-wire --dry-run          # preview config changes without writing
kei mcp-wire --list             # show enforcement tier per CLI

The orchestrator is idempotent — running twice produces the same config.

What kei mcp-wire writes

claude (TIER 1 — already enforced)

No-op. Native PreToolUse hooks already gate every tool call. kei mcp-wire claude prints the optional mcpServers snippet you can add to ~/.claude/settings.json if you want claude to also see spawn_agent for sub-agent dispatch.

grok (TIER 1 — port our hooks)

Writes ~/.grok/settings.json hooks.PreToolUse block:

  • Bash matcher → no-github-push.sh + safety-guard.sh + destructive-guard.sh
  • Edit matcher → citation-verify.sh + numeric-claims-guard.sh
  • Write matcher → citation-verify.sh + numeric-claims-guard.sh

Plus registers kei-mcp with GROKCODE=1 env (so kei-mcp's policy chain skips duplicate enforcement when invoked via Grok — your native hooks already fired).

xAI's Grok uses the same JSON input contract as Claude Code's PreToolUse, so our hook scripts run unchanged. Identical enforcement to claude.

copilot (TIER 2 — disable native shell, force MCP)

Writes ~/.copilot/mcp-config.json registering kei-mcp. To activate enforcement, launch copilot with --excluded-tools='shell':

alias copilot='copilot --excluded-tools=shell'

The agent will have NO native shell tool, only kei-mcp's kei_bash — which runs the policy chain before execution. kei_edit / kei_write similarly gate file mutations.

agy / kimi (TIER 3 — advisory)

Writes their MCP config (~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json for agy, ~/.kimi/mcp.json for kimi) registering kei-mcp.

The honest part: these CLIs do NOT have a way to disable their native shell. The agent CAN reach for native bash regardless of what we tell it. The system prompt nudges it toward kei_bash, but a determined or careless agent can bypass.

For patent-sensitive work — don't use agy or kimi as orchestrator. Use them for analysis / brainstorming / no-side-effect tasks only.

Internals

policy-chain.toml (SSoT)

One file declares which hooks gate which tool, for all CLIs that go through the MCP layer:

# ~/.claude/hooks/_lib/policy-chain.toml
[bash]
chain = ["no-github-push.sh", "safety-guard.sh", "destructive-guard.sh"]

[edit]
chain = ["citation-verify.sh", "numeric-claims-guard.sh"]

[write]
chain = ["citation-verify.sh", "numeric-claims-guard.sh"]

To add a hook: append its basename. The hook script must already exist in ~/.claude/hooks/ and follow the standard PreToolUse contract (read JSON on stdin with .tool_name + .tool_input, return exit 0 = pass / 2 = block).

kei-mcp built-in tools

kei-mcp (Rust MCP server at _primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/) exposes 4 built-in tools across two source files (both bypass the atom-discovery loop in handlers/tools.rs):

In handlers/tools.rs:

  • spawn_agent(name, task, on?) — invokes a KeiSeiKit agent on any backend

In handlers/safe_tools.rs (Phase C, v0.40+):

  • kei_bash(command, cwd?) — runs [bash] chain → executes
  • kei_edit(file_path, old_string, new_string) — runs [edit] chain → edits
  • kei_write(file_path, content) — runs [write] chain → writes

The chain runs against the same hook scripts Claude uses; identical input shape, identical decisions. On block, the hook's stderr surfaces as the MCP error message so the calling agent sees exactly why.

v0.41 hardening (post-audit fixes):

  • Fail-CLOSED on missing config — if policy-chain.toml is absent the chain refuses to run (was: silent pass-through). Tests / dev can opt in via KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 env.
  • Fail-CLOSED on missing hook script — if a hook declared in the chain is not on disk the call fails (was: warn-and-skip).
  • Path-traversal guard on kei_edit / kei_write — rejects .. segments, /etc/, /usr/, /System/, /var/, /root/, plus $HOME/{.ssh,.aws,.gnupg,.config/gcloud}/ recursively. Override via KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS=':'-separated-absolute-paths.
  • Async file I/Okei_edit / kei_write now use tokio::fs so a pathological file (/dev/random etc.) cannot block a tokio worker.
  • Process-group kill on timeoutkei_bash puts its child shell in its own process group; on timeout the entire group is killpg(SIGKILL)'d so grandchildren don't orphan (Unix-only; no-op on Windows).

Double-enforcement guard

If kei-mcp is invoked from a process where $CLAUDECODE=1 or $GROKCODE=1, it SKIPS its hook chain — the CLI's native hooks already fired. This is set automatically by kei mcp-wire claude / kei mcp-wire grok. On copilot / agy / kimi the env is unset → chain runs.

Verification

# All 4 built-ins must list:
echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}' \
  | kei-mcp | jq -r '.result.capabilities'

# Block test (kei_bash refuses forbidden command):
echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05"}}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"kei_bash","arguments":{"command":"git push https://github.com/x/y.git main"}}}' \
  | kei-mcp 2>&1 | grep "RULE 0.1"   # expects: BLOCK — RULE 0.1 NO GITHUB PUSH

# Pass test:
echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05"}}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"kei_bash","arguments":{"command":"echo OK"}}}' \
  | kei-mcp | tail -1 | jq -r '.result.content[0].text'   # expects: OK
  • Multi-CLI agent invocation — DNA-resolved agent dispatch
  • kei-mcp source: _primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools.rs
  • Policy SSoT: hooks/_lib/policy-chain.toml
  • Wire scripts: scripts/kei-mcp-wire*.sh