KeiSeiKit-1.0/_blocks/security-ssh-hardening.md
Parfii-bot a4e667de10 KeiSeiKit-public — clean state
Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells,
project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks.

Contents:
- 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/)
- 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/)
- 67 user-invocable skills (skills/)
- 33 hooks (hooks/)
- Composition blocks (_blocks/)
- Documentation (docs/, README.md)
- TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/)
- Assembler (_assembler/)
- Roles (_roles/)
- Templates (_templates/)
- Forgejo CI (.forgejo/)

Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info>

License: see LICENSE.
2026-05-01 12:09:03 +08:00

3.4 KiB

SECURITY — SSH Hardening (sshd_config.d/99-kei.conf)

Rule: hardening goes into a drop-in under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/, NEVER by editing /etc/ssh/sshd_config directly. The main file ships with distro-owned defaults; drop-ins win on later-read order and survive package upgrades cleanly.

Reference file /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-kei.conf:

# KeiSeiKit hardened SSH — pinned 2026-04-21, auditable via ssh-check.
Protocol 2
PasswordAuthentication no
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
PermitEmptyPasswords no
UsePAM yes
MaxAuthTries 3
MaxSessions 4
LoginGraceTime 20
AllowUsers keiadmin
AllowTcpForwarding no
X11Forwarding no
PermitTunnel no
ClientAliveInterval 120
ClientAliveCountMax 2
LogLevel VERBOSE
# Modern crypto only (OpenSSH ≥ 8.9, default Debian 12 / Ubuntu 22.04+):
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256

Apply with sshd -t (config test) before systemctl reload ssh. reload NOT restart — restart kills existing sessions; reload re-reads config while keeping them.

Field-by-field rationale:

  • PasswordAuthentication no — passwords are the #1 SSH brute-force vector. Keys only.
  • PermitRootLogin prohibit-password — root only via key, never password. no blocks even emergency cloud-console rescue paths on some providers; prohibit-password is the pragmatic middle.
  • MaxAuthTries 3 — reduces per-connection key/password attempts; combine with fail2ban for per-IP bans (separate concern).
  • AllowUsers keiadmin — whitelist is simpler than group-based DENY and audits trivially. Adding users = explicit edit.
  • LogLevel VERBOSE — logs the key fingerprint used; without it you can't tell which admin logged in after compromise.
  • ClientAliveInterval 120 + ClientAliveCountMax 2 — idle sessions die in 4 minutes. Lost laptops don't leave open shells.
  • AllowTcpForwarding no / PermitTunnel no — disables SSH-as-VPN. Enable per-use-case via Match User tunneluser only.

Modern KEX/Cipher/MAC lists (2026-04-21):

  • KEX: sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com is post-quantum hybrid (default since OpenSSH 9.9) [VERIFIED https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html]; curve25519-sha256 is the classic ECDH.
  • Ciphers: AEAD only (chacha20-poly1305, aes*-gcm). Dropped CBC-mode — vulnerable to Terrapin CVE-2023-48795 without strict-KEX.
  • MACs: ETM (Encrypt-Then-MAC) only. Legacy MAC-Then-Encrypt is dropped.
  • HostKey: prefer ssh-ed25519; keep rsa-sha2-* for older client compatibility. Drop ssh-rsa (SHA-1, broken).

Verification (KeiSeiKit primitive): _primitives/_rust/ssh-check/ parses BOTH sshd_config AND every sshd_config.d/*.conf (in filename sort order, last wins per directive), reports violations of the matrix above with file:line precision. Run BEFORE every systemctl reload ssh and BEFORE the skill phase-5 verify gate.

Forbidden: editing /etc/ssh/sshd_config in-place when a drop-in directory exists; PermitRootLogin yes; PasswordAuthentication yes; accepting any diffie-hellman-group1-* / ssh-rsa / CBC ciphers; restarting sshd before sshd -t passes; relying on fail2ban alone without key-only auth.