0be354a920
Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells, project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks. Contents: - 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/) - 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/) - 67 user-invocable skills (skills/) - 33 hooks (hooks/) - Composition blocks (_blocks/) - Documentation (docs/, README.md) - TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/) - Assembler (_assembler/) - Roles (_roles/) - Templates (_templates/) - Forgejo CI (.forgejo/) Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info> License: see LICENSE.
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Phase 3 — Session strategy + cookie configuration
|
||
|
||
Decides how the authenticated principal is carried across requests. Reads
|
||
`_blocks/auth-sessions.md` heavily. Default bias: server-side opaque
|
||
sessions (revocable, simple) unless the user needs horizontal stateless
|
||
scale.
|
||
|
||
## 3a — Strategy click (AskUserQuestion, single-select)
|
||
|
||
```json
|
||
{
|
||
"questions": [
|
||
{
|
||
"question": "Session carrier?",
|
||
"header": "Session",
|
||
"multiSelect": false,
|
||
"options": [
|
||
{"label": "Server-side session + cookie (DEFAULT)",
|
||
"description": "Opaque 256-bit id in HttpOnly Secure cookie; row in DB/Redis. Instant revoke. Recommended for >95% of apps."},
|
||
{"label": "JWT access + opaque refresh",
|
||
"description": "ES256 access ≤15 min in HttpOnly cookie; refresh rotated server-side. Use ONLY when you have stateless edge workers that can't reach the session DB."},
|
||
{"label": "JWT access + refresh in native secure storage",
|
||
"description": "Mobile app; refresh in Keychain / Keystore. Same rotation rules; cookie flags N/A."},
|
||
{"label": "Managed (Clerk / Supabase / Auth0)",
|
||
"description": "Provider owns the session primitive; skill records the SDK integration points only."}
|
||
]
|
||
}
|
||
]
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Store as `SESSION`.
|
||
|
||
## 3b — Emit cookie-flag checklist (inline, no AskUserQuestion)
|
||
|
||
Apply ONLY when `SESSION` involves a browser cookie. For every cookie the
|
||
app sets (session, CSRF, anti-re-use nonce):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
[ ] HttpOnly — blocks JS read; XSS-resistant
|
||
[ ] Secure — HTTPS only; reject on cleartext
|
||
[ ] SameSite=Lax — default; use Strict for cross-site-hostile apps
|
||
[ ] __Host- prefix — no Domain, Path=/, Secure — session cookie only
|
||
[ ] Max-Age tuned — 7–30 d sliding (consumer) / 24 h hard (regulated)
|
||
[ ] Rotation on login, — new session_id issued, old row deleted or revoked_at set
|
||
logout-all, passkey/password change, privilege elevation
|
||
[ ] Logout deletes BOTH — server row AND cookie (Max-Age=0, same flags)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## 3c — Emit JWT-specific checklist (inline) — only if JWT chosen
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
[ ] Algorithm = ES256 — asymmetric; NOT HS256 for cross-service
|
||
[ ] access_token ≤15 min — minimises revocation-gap window
|
||
[ ] refresh_token OPAQUE — stored server-side, rotated on every use
|
||
[ ] refresh-reuse detection — family revocation on stolen refresh
|
||
[ ] JWKS rotation + kid — key rollover without service restart
|
||
[ ] Claims validated — iss, aud, exp, nbf, iat, sub, nonce (if OIDC)
|
||
[ ] NEVER in localStorage — HttpOnly cookie (web) / secure storage (native)
|
||
[ ] Logout policy stated — "revoke refresh only; access valid until exp"
|
||
and accepted by the product (or escalate to server-session strategy)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## 3d — CSRF strategy (inline, driven by SESSION)
|
||
|
||
- Cookie session + same-origin forms → `SameSite=Lax` is enough; plus a
|
||
CSRF token (cookie+header double-submit) for cross-origin POSTs.
|
||
- Cookie session + third-party embed (iframes, extensions) → `SameSite=None;
|
||
Secure` + mandatory CSRF token, reject missing/mismatched.
|
||
- Bearer-token API (no cookie) → no CSRF (no ambient credential); enforce
|
||
`Origin` header check as defence-in-depth.
|
||
|
||
## Verify-criterion
|
||
|
||
- `SESSION` set to exactly one strategy.
|
||
- At least one of the three checklists (3b / 3c / 3d) applies and was
|
||
emitted.
|
||
- If JWT chosen, 3c is printed in full AND the logout gap was explicitly
|
||
acknowledged in the report.
|