Opus Cross-cutting audit found a classic OIDC account-takeover hole in
kei-auth-google::verify(). Same class as the public Booking.com / Slack /
GitLab pattern.
Root cause: verify() accepted info.email from userinfo response as user_id
WITHOUT checking info.email_verified. A Google Workspace admin can mint
accounts with arbitrary unverified email aliases. Attacker then OAuth-flows
into the relying party using a victim's email as their alias and gets a
session bound to that user_id. No email verification = no auth.
Fix in 3 layers (defense in depth):
1. email_verified GATE
- client.rs: UserInfo gains email_verified: bool with #[serde(default)] —
absent field defaults to false (fail-closed).
- error.rs: new Error::EmailNotVerified variant.
- provider.rs::verify(): rejects with EmailNotVerified before any session
is built when email_verified != true.
2. sub AS PRIMARY user_id
- provider.rs::verify(): user_id = info.sub (Google's stable account id),
NOT info.email. Email is now mutable metadata only. Email reassignment
in Google Workspace cannot redirect an existing user_id binding.
3. id_token.sub CROSS-CHECK
- id_token.rs (new, 104 LOC): JWT-claims-only extract_sub() — parses
base64-payload without signature verification (signature verification
against Google JWKS is a documented follow-up atomar).
- provider.rs::verify(): when TokenResponse.id_token is present, decode
claims and require id_token.sub == userinfo.sub. New
Error::IdSubMismatch + IdTokenMalformed variants.
- This adds defense against a forged userinfo response even though
signature is not yet verified.
Constructor Pattern compliance: provider.rs split into provider.rs (181 LOC)
+ verify_helpers.rs (114 LOC, with unpack_challenge / check_state /
enforce_email_verified / cross_check_id_token_sub helpers). All files <200
LOC, all functions <30 LOC.
Tests added: tests/google_security_regression.rs (164 LOC, 5 dedicated
CVE-2023-7028 regression tests). All 26 tests pass:
- verify_rejects_unverified_email
- verify_rejects_missing_email_verified_field
- verify_uses_sub_not_email_as_user_id
- verify_rejects_id_token_sub_mismatch
- verify_accepts_matching_id_token_sub
cargo check --workspace clean. cargo test -p kei-auth-google: 26/26 pass.
Follow-up: JWT signature verification against Google's JWKS endpoint with
kid-based key cache + RS256/ES256 — separate atomar (~150 LOC).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
164 lines
5.5 KiB
Rust
164 lines
5.5 KiB
Rust
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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// Copyright 2026 <author org>
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//!
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//! CVE-2023-7028 class regression tests for `GoogleAuthProvider`.
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//!
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//! Booking.com / Slack / GitLab were all hit by the same pattern: an
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//! OIDC relying-party trusted `userinfo.email` without checking
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//! `email_verified`, allowing a Workspace admin to mint accounts with
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//! arbitrary unverified email aliases and sign in as any user.
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//!
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//! These tests ensure `verify()`:
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//! 1. refuses `email_verified == false`
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//! 2. refuses absent `email_verified`
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//! 3. uses `sub` (not `email`) as `user_id`
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//! 4. cross-checks `id_token.sub == userinfo.sub` when an `id_token`
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//! is returned, and rejects mismatch
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//! 5. accepts the happy path when both are equal
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use base64::Engine as _;
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use kei_auth_google::{GoogleAuthClient, GoogleAuthProvider};
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use kei_runtime_core::traits::auth::{AuthChallenge, AuthProvider};
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use serde_json::json;
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use wiremock::matchers::{method, path};
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use wiremock::{Mock, MockServer, ResponseTemplate};
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fn client_for(server: &MockServer) -> GoogleAuthClient {
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GoogleAuthClient::with_urls(
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format!("{}/token", server.uri()),
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format!("{}/userinfo", server.uri()),
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"client-id-xyz",
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"client-secret-xyz",
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"https://example.com/cb",
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)
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.unwrap()
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}
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fn challenge() -> AuthChallenge {
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AuthChallenge::OAuthCode {
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provider: "google".into(),
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code: "c".into(),
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state: "s".into(),
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expected_state: "s".into(),
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code_verifier: None,
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}
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}
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fn make_jwt_with_sub(sub: &str) -> String {
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let header = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
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.encode(br#"{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}"#);
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let claims_json = format!(r#"{{"sub":"{sub}","aud":"client-id-xyz"}}"#);
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let claims = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
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.encode(claims_json.as_bytes());
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format!("{header}.{claims}.fake-sig-not-verified-yet")
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}
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async fn mock_token_no_id(server: &MockServer) {
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Mock::given(method("POST"))
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.and(path("/token"))
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.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(json!({
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"access_token": "tok",
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"expires_in": 1800,
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"id_token": null
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})))
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.mount(server)
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.await;
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}
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async fn mock_token_with_id(server: &MockServer, id_token: String) {
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Mock::given(method("POST"))
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.and(path("/token"))
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.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(json!({
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"access_token": "tok",
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"expires_in": 1800,
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"id_token": id_token
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})))
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.mount(server)
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.await;
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}
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async fn mock_userinfo(server: &MockServer, body: serde_json::Value) {
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Mock::given(method("GET"))
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.and(path("/userinfo"))
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.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(body))
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.mount(server)
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.await;
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn verify_rejects_unverified_email() {
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let server = MockServer::start().await;
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mock_token_no_id(&server).await;
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mock_userinfo(&server, json!({
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"sub": "attacker-sub",
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"email": "victim@target.example",
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"email_verified": false,
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"name": "Attacker"
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})).await;
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let provider = GoogleAuthProvider::new(client_for(&server), None).unwrap();
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let err = provider.verify(&challenge()).await.unwrap_err();
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let msg = format!("{err}");
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assert!(
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msg.contains("not verified") || msg.contains("email"),
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"expected email-not-verified error, got: {msg}"
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);
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn verify_rejects_missing_email_verified_field() {
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let server = MockServer::start().await;
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mock_token_no_id(&server).await;
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mock_userinfo(&server, json!({
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"sub": "abc",
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"email": "x@y.z",
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"name": "Default"
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})).await;
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let provider = GoogleAuthProvider::new(client_for(&server), None).unwrap();
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assert!(provider.verify(&challenge()).await.is_err());
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn verify_uses_sub_not_email_as_user_id() {
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let server = MockServer::start().await;
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mock_token_no_id(&server).await;
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mock_userinfo(&server, json!({
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"sub": "stable-google-account-id-12345",
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"email": "alice@example.com",
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"email_verified": true,
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"name": "Alice"
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})).await;
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let provider = GoogleAuthProvider::new(client_for(&server), None).unwrap();
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let session = provider.verify(&challenge()).await.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(session.user_id, "stable-google-account-id-12345");
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assert_ne!(session.user_id, "alice@example.com");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn verify_rejects_id_token_sub_mismatch() {
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let server = MockServer::start().await;
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mock_token_with_id(&server, make_jwt_with_sub("ATTACKER-SUB")).await;
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mock_userinfo(&server, json!({
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"sub": "VICTIM-SUB",
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"email": "v@example.com",
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"email_verified": true,
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"name": "Victim"
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})).await;
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let provider = GoogleAuthProvider::new(client_for(&server), None).unwrap();
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let err = provider.verify(&challenge()).await.unwrap_err();
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assert!(format!("{err}").contains("sub"), "expected sub-mismatch error");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn verify_accepts_matching_id_token_sub() {
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let server = MockServer::start().await;
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mock_token_with_id(&server, make_jwt_with_sub("happy-sub")).await;
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mock_userinfo(&server, json!({
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"sub": "happy-sub",
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"email": "h@e.io",
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"email_verified": true,
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"name": "Happy"
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})).await;
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let provider = GoogleAuthProvider::new(client_for(&server), None).unwrap();
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let session = provider.verify(&challenge()).await.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(session.user_id, "happy-sub");
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}
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