Two resource-exhaustion fixes from Opus Rust + Sonnet Rust audits. 1. kei-cortex per_user_locks DashMap unbounded growth (HIGH) File: kei-cortex/src/state.rs Bug: per_user_locks: DashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<()>>> inserted on every distinct user_id; never evicted. Auth'd attacker with 1M unique user_ids could OOM the daemon (~150 bytes/entry = 15GB at 100M entries). Fix: replaced DashMap with tokio::sync::Mutex<LruCache<String, Arc<TokioMutex<()>>>> capped at PER_USER_LOCK_CAP = 1024. Eviction is safe because callers hold their own Arc clone for their critical section; dropping the registry slot retires only the registry's reference. Used tokio::sync::Mutex for the registry because LruCache::get mutates the recency list and requires &mut self. Constructor Pattern: state.rs split into state.rs (184 LOC) + state_factories.rs (64 LOC, new). Tests added: user_lock_evicts_past_cap (registry stays ≤1024 after 2048 inserts), user_lock_keeps_most_recent (LRU recency preserved). Existing user_lock_is_stable_per_user + user_lock_differs_per_user updated to async — sole call site (handlers/portrait.rs) gains .await. 2. kei-runtime stdout/stderr cap was post-hoc (HIGH) File: kei-runtime/src/invoke.rs Bug: wait_with_output() buffered ALL child stdout/stderr; only cap_bytes truncated AFTER the child finished. A malicious atom writing 10 GB stdout (or a buggy one looping infinitely) OOM'd the runtime BEFORE the cap fired. Fix: replaced wait_with_output() with two reader threads sharing KillHandle = Arc<Mutex<Option<Child>>>. Each reader appends bytes up to STREAM_CAP = 16 MiB; on cap exceedance the reader KILLS the child from inside the reader thread (critical — otherwise the unbounded writer would never EOF and a post-hoc kill would never fire). Both readers drain the closing pipe to EOF and return. Truncation surfaces as InvokeError::SubprocessError with explicit "exceeded N byte cap" message. Constructor Pattern: invoke.rs decomposed into invoke.rs (159 LOC) + invoke_io.rs (146 LOC, new) + invoke_error.rs (54 LOC, new). Test added: invoke_kills_runaway_atom — stages a kei-flood script running cat /dev/zero, verifies (a) non-zero exit, (b) stdout < 18 MiB, (c) "cap"/"subprocess" in stderr. cargo check --workspace: clean. cargo test -p kei-cortex -p kei-runtime --test-threads=1: 471 pass / 0 fail. Pre-existing openai_loop_wiring.rs parallel-run flake (state collision when test-threads>1) is unrelated and unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 lines
580 B
Rust
16 lines
580 B
Rust
//! kei-runtime — atom invocation runtime + schema linter.
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//!
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//! Four modules:
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//! - `discover` — walks `<root>/*/atoms/*.md`, parses YAML frontmatter
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//! - `validate` — JSON Schema draft-07 validation of input/output
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//! - `invoke` — MVP stub: discovers + validates, exec wire-up TBD
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//! - `lint` — `schema-lint` correctness pass over atom frontmatter
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//!
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//! Per `docs/SUBSTRATE-SCHEMA.md` §Runtime invocation contract (LOCKED).
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pub mod discover;
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pub mod invoke;
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pub(crate) mod invoke_error;
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pub(crate) mod invoke_io;
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pub mod lint;
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pub mod validate;
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