KeiSeiKit-1.0/_primitives/_rust/kei-auth-google/src/client.rs
Parfii-bot f47c087646 feat(auth): JWT verification + OAuth CSRF + PKCE + secret redaction
Group B — auth-crate security hardening (post-audit Sonnet test-retest 2026-05-02).

kei-auth-apple:
- jwt.rs: full ES256 JWKS signature verification (jsonwebtoken crate);
          validates iss == https://appleid.apple.com, aud == client_id, exp, iat;
          decode_id_token_unverified is now cfg(test)-only.
          Module docstring promised this since v0.1 — now actually implemented.
- claims.rs (new): IdTokenClaims + AudClaim extracted from jwt.rs.
- error.rs: JwtVerify, JwtDecode, MissingClaim variants.
- client.rs: client_secret_jwt: SecretString (was String); exchange_code accepts
              code_verifier: Option<&str> for PKCE.
- provider.rs: verify() does CSRF expected_state ConstantTimeEq + JWT verification;
                build_auth_url accepts state + verifier and emits PKCE code_challenge.
- tests/apple_smoke.rs + helpers/: 6 tests including malformed-JWT + non-Apple OAuth +
                                     400-mapping + provider_verify_csrf_mismatch_rejected.

kei-auth-google:
- pkce.rs (new): pkce_challenge + url_encode (RFC 7636 §B.1 test vector covered).
- client.rs: client_secret: SecretString; exchange_code accepts code_verifier.
- provider.rs: verify() rejects on state mismatch; build_auth_url emits S256 challenge.
- tests/google_smoke.rs: 7 tests including CSRF mismatch.

kei-auth:
- main.rs: resolve_token() supports stdin (-) and KEI_AUTH_TOKEN env. Token positional
            arg leaked via /proc/<pid>/cmdline + shell history; same fix that v0.14.1
            applied to --key.
- main.rs::key(): hard fail if KEI_AUTH_KEY len < 32 bytes (mirror of magiclink).
- tokens.rs::verify(): query_row(...).optional()? instead of .ok() — DB errors now
                        propagate instead of being swallowed as "token unknown".

kei-runtime-core:
- secrets.rs (new, 81 LOC): SecretString newtype with redacted Debug + zeroize-on-Drop.
                              Required by every auth crate that holds secret material.
- traits/auth.rs: AuthChallenge::Password.password is now SecretString;
                   OAuthCode { state, expected_state }.
- error.rs: CsrfStateMismatch variant.

Test results: 48 passed; 0 failed across kei-auth, kei-auth-apple, kei-auth-google,
kei-auth-magiclink, kei-runtime-core. cargo check --workspace clean.

Findings consensus: Apple JWT unverified + OAuth state CSRF appeared in all 3
audit waves (Wave-1 + Wave-A + Wave-B); PKCE absence + secret-derive-Debug appeared
only in Wave-A retest, would have been missed by single-pass audit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 21:39:18 +08:00

157 lines
5.6 KiB
Rust

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
// Copyright 2026 <author org>
//!
//! Thin async client for Google OAuth 2.0 token + OIDC userinfo endpoints.
//!
//! Two HTTP calls cover the verify path:
//! 1. `POST {token_url}` (x-www-form-urlencoded) → access_token + id_token
//! 2. `GET {userinfo_url}` with `Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use kei_runtime_core::SecretString;
use reqwest::{Client, StatusCode};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::time::Duration;
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
const DEFAULT_TOKEN_URL: &str = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";
const DEFAULT_USERINFO_URL: &str = "https://openidconnect.googleapis.com/v1/userinfo";
/// Authorization endpoint — used only by [`super::provider::GoogleAuthProvider::build_auth_url`].
pub const DEFAULT_AUTH_URL: &str = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth";
/// Token-endpoint response (RFC 6749 §5.1 + OIDC `id_token`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TokenResponse {
pub access_token: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub expires_in: i64,
#[serde(default)]
pub id_token: Option<String>,
}
/// Userinfo response (OIDC core §5.3.2 — only the fields we surface).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserInfo {
pub sub: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub email: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub name: String,
}
/// Async client wrapping the two relevant Google endpoints.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct GoogleAuthClient {
http: Client,
token_url: String,
userinfo_url: String,
client_id: String,
/// Wrapped in `SecretString` so it prints as `<redacted>` in logs.
client_secret: SecretString,
redirect_uri: String,
}
impl GoogleAuthClient {
/// Build from `GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, `GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`,
/// `GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI`. Uses production token + userinfo URLs.
pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self> {
let client_id = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID")
.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID unset".into()))?;
let client_secret = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET")
.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET unset".into()))?;
let redirect_uri = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI")
.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI unset".into()))?;
Self::with_urls(
DEFAULT_TOKEN_URL, DEFAULT_USERINFO_URL,
client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri,
)
}
/// Explicit-URL constructor — used by `wiremock` and any caller that
/// wants to bypass process-env lookup.
pub fn with_urls(
token_url: impl Into<String>,
userinfo_url: impl Into<String>,
client_id: impl Into<String>,
client_secret: impl Into<String>,
redirect_uri: impl Into<String>,
) -> Result<Self> {
let http = Client::builder()
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS))
.build()
.map_err(Error::from)?;
Ok(Self {
http,
token_url: token_url.into(),
userinfo_url: userinfo_url.into(),
client_id: client_id.into(),
client_secret: SecretString::new(client_secret),
redirect_uri: redirect_uri.into(),
})
}
/// `POST {token_url}` (x-www-form-urlencoded) →
/// [`TokenResponse`]. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 authorization-code grant.
///
/// If `code_verifier` is `Some`, it is appended as the PKCE
/// `code_verifier` parameter per RFC 7636 §4.5.
pub async fn exchange_code(
&self,
code: &str,
code_verifier: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<TokenResponse> {
let secret = self.client_secret.expose();
let mut form: Vec<(&str, &str)> = vec![
("client_id", self.client_id.as_str()),
("client_secret", secret),
("code", code),
("redirect_uri", self.redirect_uri.as_str()),
("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
];
if let Some(cv) = code_verifier {
form.push(("code_verifier", cv));
}
let resp = self
.http
.post(&self.token_url)
.header("accept", "application/json")
.form(&form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = resp.status();
if !status.is_success() {
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(Error::Api(format!("token http {status}: {body}")));
}
let token: TokenResponse = resp.json().await?;
Ok(token)
}
/// `GET {userinfo_url}` with `Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`.
pub async fn userinfo(&self, access_token: &str) -> Result<UserInfo> {
let resp = self
.http
.get(&self.userinfo_url)
.bearer_auth(access_token)
.header("accept", "application/json")
.send()
.await?;
match resp.status() {
StatusCode::OK => {
let info: UserInfo = resp.json().await?;
Ok(info)
}
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND => Err(Error::NotFound("userinfo".into())),
s => {
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
Err(Error::Api(format!("userinfo http {s}: {body}")))
}
}
}
/// Borrow `client_id` (used by `build_auth_url`).
pub fn client_id(&self) -> &str { &self.client_id }
/// Borrow `redirect_uri` (used by `build_auth_url`).
pub fn redirect_uri(&self) -> &str { &self.redirect_uri }
}