cb1090bef3
Group D — three independent security primitives hardening (post-audit 2026-05-02).
kei-runtime — atom invoke RCE allowlist:
- invoke.rs: is_safe_crate_name validator (regex ^kei-[a-z][a-z0-9-]+$);
rejects /, \\, .., :, absolute paths, empty, >128 chars.
InvalidAtom error variant.
stdout/stderr capped at 16 MiB (was unbounded).
- main.rs: InvalidAtom mapped to exit code 2.
- tests/invoke_exit_codes_smoke.rs: invoke_unsafe_crate_name_exits_2 added.
- Closes: any user able to write atoms/*.md with crate_name: "rm" or "sudo"
triggered arbitrary command execution.
kei-graph-stream — WebSocket bearer + Origin:
- auth.rs (new, 142 LOC): token load + bearer extraction + Origin allowlist +
ConstantTimeEq compare; 8 unit tests.
- ws.rs: ws_handler validates Origin + bearer before upgrade (403/401 on failure).
- main.rs: --public-bind-i-accept-the-leak flag required for non-loopback bind;
else bail!() with explicit error.
- tests/smoke.rs: rewritten with Origin + bearer headers via connect_async_with_config.
- Closes: WebSocket /stream had zero auth, zero Origin check; browser CSWSH could
subscribe to agent activity broadcast; KEI_GRAPH_STREAM_BIND env silently
accepted any SocketAddr.
kei-compute-baremetal — SSH option injection (CVE-2023-51385 class):
- ssh.rs: is_safe_user + is_safe_host validators (alphanumeric + -_.; reject leading -;
max 64 chars; no @, :, /, \\, space).
- ssh.rs: -- sentinel before user@host argv (OpenSSH 9.6+ stops flag parsing).
- ssh.rs: StrictHostKeyChecking=yes default; KEI_BAREMETAL_ACCEPT_NEW=1 for TOFU.
- error.rs: InvalidRegion variant.
- provider.rs: validators applied in target_for_spec + target_for_handle.
- Closes: spec.region "-oProxyCommand=evil" triggered local RCE before TCP connect.
Test results: 29 passed; 0 failed across all three crates. cargo check clean.
Findings: RCE allowlist (Wave-A) + WebSocket auth (Wave-B) + SSH injection (Wave-B)
were unique-per-retest discoveries. None present in original wave-1 audit.
Note: kei-compute-baremetal/src/provider.rs at 300 LOC (was 268; +32 from validators).
Pre-existing >200 LOC violation, fix scope was security-additions only. Follow-up:
split provider.rs into provider.rs (<200) + provider_tests.rs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
6 lines
83 B
Rust
6 lines
83 B
Rust
pub mod auth;
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pub mod state;
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pub mod tail;
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pub mod ws;
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pub use state::AliveState;
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