Opus Cross-cutting audit found a classic OIDC account-takeover hole in
kei-auth-google::verify(). Same class as the public Booking.com / Slack /
GitLab pattern.
Root cause: verify() accepted info.email from userinfo response as user_id
WITHOUT checking info.email_verified. A Google Workspace admin can mint
accounts with arbitrary unverified email aliases. Attacker then OAuth-flows
into the relying party using a victim's email as their alias and gets a
session bound to that user_id. No email verification = no auth.
Fix in 3 layers (defense in depth):
1. email_verified GATE
- client.rs: UserInfo gains email_verified: bool with #[serde(default)] —
absent field defaults to false (fail-closed).
- error.rs: new Error::EmailNotVerified variant.
- provider.rs::verify(): rejects with EmailNotVerified before any session
is built when email_verified != true.
2. sub AS PRIMARY user_id
- provider.rs::verify(): user_id = info.sub (Google's stable account id),
NOT info.email. Email is now mutable metadata only. Email reassignment
in Google Workspace cannot redirect an existing user_id binding.
3. id_token.sub CROSS-CHECK
- id_token.rs (new, 104 LOC): JWT-claims-only extract_sub() — parses
base64-payload without signature verification (signature verification
against Google JWKS is a documented follow-up atomar).
- provider.rs::verify(): when TokenResponse.id_token is present, decode
claims and require id_token.sub == userinfo.sub. New
Error::IdSubMismatch + IdTokenMalformed variants.
- This adds defense against a forged userinfo response even though
signature is not yet verified.
Constructor Pattern compliance: provider.rs split into provider.rs (181 LOC)
+ verify_helpers.rs (114 LOC, with unpack_challenge / check_state /
enforce_email_verified / cross_check_id_token_sub helpers). All files <200
LOC, all functions <30 LOC.
Tests added: tests/google_security_regression.rs (164 LOC, 5 dedicated
CVE-2023-7028 regression tests). All 26 tests pass:
- verify_rejects_unverified_email
- verify_rejects_missing_email_verified_field
- verify_uses_sub_not_email_as_user_id
- verify_rejects_id_token_sub_mismatch
- verify_accepts_matching_id_token_sub
cargo check --workspace clean. cargo test -p kei-auth-google: 26/26 pass.
Follow-up: JWT signature verification against Google's JWKS endpoint with
kid-based key cache + RS256/ES256 — separate atomar (~150 LOC).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
169 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust
169 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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// Copyright 2026 <author org>
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//!
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//! Thin async client for Google OAuth 2.0 token + OIDC userinfo endpoints.
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//!
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//! Two HTTP calls cover the verify path:
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//! 1. `POST {token_url}` (x-www-form-urlencoded) → access_token + id_token
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//! 2. `GET {userinfo_url}` with `Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`
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use crate::error::{Error, Result};
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use kei_runtime_core::SecretString;
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use reqwest::{Client, StatusCode};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use std::time::Duration;
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const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
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const DEFAULT_TOKEN_URL: &str = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";
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const DEFAULT_USERINFO_URL: &str = "https://openidconnect.googleapis.com/v1/userinfo";
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/// Authorization endpoint — used only by [`super::provider::GoogleAuthProvider::build_auth_url`].
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pub const DEFAULT_AUTH_URL: &str = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth";
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/// Token-endpoint response (RFC 6749 §5.1 + OIDC `id_token`).
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct TokenResponse {
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pub access_token: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub expires_in: i64,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub id_token: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Userinfo response (OIDC core §5.3.2 — only the fields we surface).
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///
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/// `email_verified` is **load-bearing for security**: a Google Workspace
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/// admin can mint accounts with arbitrary unverified email aliases, and
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/// a relying party that trusts `email` without checking the verified
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/// flag is vulnerable to the CVE-2023-7028 class of account-takeover
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/// (Booking.com / Slack / GitLab). Always pair the `email` field with
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/// the verified flag at the call site.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub struct UserInfo {
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pub sub: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub email: String,
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/// OIDC `email_verified` boolean. Defaults to `false` when the
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/// provider omits the claim — that matches the safe interpretation
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/// (refuse rather than trust).
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#[serde(default)]
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pub email_verified: bool,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub name: String,
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}
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/// Async client wrapping the two relevant Google endpoints.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct GoogleAuthClient {
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http: Client,
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token_url: String,
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userinfo_url: String,
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client_id: String,
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/// Wrapped in `SecretString` so it prints as `<redacted>` in logs.
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client_secret: SecretString,
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redirect_uri: String,
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}
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impl GoogleAuthClient {
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/// Build from `GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, `GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`,
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/// `GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI`. Uses production token + userinfo URLs.
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pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self> {
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let client_id = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID")
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.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID unset".into()))?;
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let client_secret = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET")
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.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET unset".into()))?;
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let redirect_uri = std::env::var("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI")
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.map_err(|_| Error::Config("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI unset".into()))?;
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Self::with_urls(
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DEFAULT_TOKEN_URL, DEFAULT_USERINFO_URL,
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client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri,
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)
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}
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/// Explicit-URL constructor — used by `wiremock` and any caller that
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/// wants to bypass process-env lookup.
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pub fn with_urls(
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token_url: impl Into<String>,
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userinfo_url: impl Into<String>,
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client_id: impl Into<String>,
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client_secret: impl Into<String>,
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redirect_uri: impl Into<String>,
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) -> Result<Self> {
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let http = Client::builder()
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.timeout(Duration::from_secs(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS))
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.build()
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.map_err(Error::from)?;
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Ok(Self {
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http,
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token_url: token_url.into(),
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userinfo_url: userinfo_url.into(),
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client_id: client_id.into(),
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client_secret: SecretString::new(client_secret),
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redirect_uri: redirect_uri.into(),
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})
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}
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/// `POST {token_url}` (x-www-form-urlencoded) →
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/// [`TokenResponse`]. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 authorization-code grant.
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///
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/// If `code_verifier` is `Some`, it is appended as the PKCE
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/// `code_verifier` parameter per RFC 7636 §4.5.
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pub async fn exchange_code(
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&self,
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code: &str,
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code_verifier: Option<&str>,
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) -> Result<TokenResponse> {
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let secret = self.client_secret.expose();
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let mut form: Vec<(&str, &str)> = vec![
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("client_id", self.client_id.as_str()),
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("client_secret", secret),
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("code", code),
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("redirect_uri", self.redirect_uri.as_str()),
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("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
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];
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if let Some(cv) = code_verifier {
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form.push(("code_verifier", cv));
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}
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let resp = self
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.http
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.post(&self.token_url)
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.header("accept", "application/json")
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.form(&form)
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.send()
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.await?;
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let status = resp.status();
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if !status.is_success() {
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let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
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return Err(Error::Api(format!("token http {status}: {body}")));
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}
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let token: TokenResponse = resp.json().await?;
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Ok(token)
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}
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/// `GET {userinfo_url}` with `Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`.
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pub async fn userinfo(&self, access_token: &str) -> Result<UserInfo> {
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let resp = self
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.http
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.get(&self.userinfo_url)
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.bearer_auth(access_token)
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.header("accept", "application/json")
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.send()
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.await?;
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match resp.status() {
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StatusCode::OK => {
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let info: UserInfo = resp.json().await?;
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Ok(info)
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}
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StatusCode::NOT_FOUND => Err(Error::NotFound("userinfo".into())),
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s => {
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let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
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Err(Error::Api(format!("userinfo http {s}: {body}")))
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}
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}
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}
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/// Borrow `client_id` (used by `build_auth_url`).
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pub fn client_id(&self) -> &str { &self.client_id }
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/// Borrow `redirect_uri` (used by `build_auth_url`).
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pub fn redirect_uri(&self) -> &str { &self.redirect_uri }
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}
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