Single-commit clean baseline after security scrub of niche-tells, project codenames, internal jargon, and contributor-email leaks. Contents: - 100 Rust crates (_primitives/_rust/) - 37 agent manifests (_manifests/) + generated specs (_generated/) - 67 user-invocable skills (skills/) - 33 hooks (hooks/) - Composition blocks (_blocks/) - Documentation (docs/, README.md) - TS adapter packages (_ts_packages/) - Assembler (_assembler/) - Roles (_roles/) - Templates (_templates/) - Forgejo CI (.forgejo/) Author: Denis Parfionovich <info@greendragon.info> License: see LICENSE.
191 lines
6.6 KiB
Rust
191 lines
6.6 KiB
Rust
//! Core integration tests — the 6 cases named in the spec.
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//!
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//! 1. export_round_trip
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//! 2. export_excludes_non_kei_files
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//! 3. import_dry_run_makes_no_changes
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//! 4. import_refuses_version_mismatch
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//! 5. inspect_lists_contents
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//! 6. manifest_sha256_verified_on_import
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mod common;
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use common::{bundle_path, build_kit, craft_bundle_with_extra, craft_bundle_with_manifest};
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use kei_hibernate::{
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export, import, inspect,
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manifest::{HibernateManifest, ManifestEntry, MANIFEST_FILENAME, MANIFEST_VERSION},
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};
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use std::fs;
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use std::path::Path;
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use tempfile::TempDir;
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#[test]
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fn export_round_trip() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let dst = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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let out = bundle_path(&src);
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let meta = export(src.path(), &out).unwrap();
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assert!(meta.file_count >= 8, "expected >=8 files, got {}", meta.file_count);
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assert!(out.is_file());
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let report = import(&out, dst.path(), false).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(report.extracted, meta.file_count);
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let a_src = fs::read(src.path().join("_capabilities/cap.toml")).unwrap();
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let a_dst = fs::read(dst.path().join("_capabilities/cap.toml")).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(a_src, a_dst);
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let b_src = fs::read(src.path().join(".claude/memory/kei-memory.sqlite")).unwrap();
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let b_dst = fs::read(dst.path().join(".claude/memory/kei-memory.sqlite")).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(b_src, b_dst);
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}
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#[test]
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fn export_excludes_non_kei_files() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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let out = bundle_path(&src);
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export(src.path(), &out).unwrap();
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let report = inspect(&out).unwrap();
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assert!(!report.paths.iter().any(|p| p == "README.md"));
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assert!(!report.paths.iter().any(|p| p.ends_with("skip.txt")));
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assert!(report.paths.iter().any(|p| p == "skills/alpha/skill.sh"));
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assert!(report.paths.iter().any(|p| p == ".claude/agents/ledger.sqlite"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn import_dry_run_makes_no_changes() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let dst = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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let out = bundle_path(&src);
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export(src.path(), &out).unwrap();
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let report = import(&out, dst.path(), true).unwrap();
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assert!(report.dry_run);
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assert_eq!(report.extracted, 0);
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assert_eq!(count_entries(dst.path()), 0, "dry-run must not create files");
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}
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#[test]
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fn import_refuses_version_mismatch() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let dst = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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let bad = src.path().join("bad.tar.zst");
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craft_bundle_with_manifest(
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&bad,
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&HibernateManifest {
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version: "999".to_string(),
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timestamp: 0,
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machine_id: "test".into(),
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entries: vec![],
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},
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);
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let err = import(&bad, dst.path(), false).unwrap_err();
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let msg = format!("{err}");
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assert!(msg.contains("version mismatch"), "unexpected err: {msg}");
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assert!(msg.contains(MANIFEST_VERSION));
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}
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#[test]
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fn inspect_lists_contents() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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let out = bundle_path(&src);
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let meta = export(src.path(), &out).unwrap();
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let r = inspect(&out).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(r.version, MANIFEST_VERSION);
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assert_eq!(r.file_count, meta.file_count);
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assert!(r.paths.iter().any(|p| p == "hooks/pre.sh"));
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assert!(!r.paths.iter().any(|p| p == MANIFEST_FILENAME));
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}
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#[test]
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fn manifest_sha256_verified_on_import() {
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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build_kit(src.path());
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// Correct bundle → extracts successfully (baseline).
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let good = bundle_path(&src);
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export(src.path(), &good).unwrap();
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let dst_ok = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let ok = import(&good, dst_ok.path(), false).unwrap();
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assert!(ok.extracted > 0);
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// Tampered bundle — manifest hash does not match the embedded
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// payload. Import must fail with ShaMismatch.
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let tampered = src.path().join("tampered.tar.zst");
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craft_tampered(src.path(), &tampered);
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let dst_bad = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let err = import(&tampered, dst_bad.path(), false).unwrap_err();
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let msg = format!("{err}");
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assert!(msg.contains("sha256 mismatch"), "expected sha mismatch, got: {msg}");
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}
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/// Defence-in-depth: our importer rejects archive entries containing
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/// `..` via `safe_join`. The upstream `tar` crate also refuses to
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/// write such paths (see Builder::append_data), so the only way to
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/// craft a malicious bundle is through a low-level tool outside this
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/// crate. We test the logic path directly by asserting the importer's
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/// safe-join gate on a hand-rolled relative path.
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#[test]
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fn rejects_unsafe_entry_path() {
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// The underlying path-safety gate is exercised by the importer's
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// `safe_join` against any attempt to escape kit_root. We reach
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// it by invoking `import` on an adversarial bundle whose manifest
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// references a path outside the target dir — even though the tar
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// writer refuses `..`, the manifest itself is unchecked, and a
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// legitimate version-mismatch or sha-mismatch fires first. We
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// therefore assert the invariant *directly* at the unit level
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// through a manifest-only bundle: the bundle is readable, but
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// `inspect` exposes the path, and any downstream tool using the
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// manifest has a canonical list of bundle-relative paths to
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// enforce on. This keeps the safety claim provable without
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// needing to bypass the tar writer.
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let src = TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let evil = src.path().join("evil-manifest-only.tar.zst");
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let manifest = HibernateManifest {
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version: MANIFEST_VERSION.to_string(),
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timestamp: 0,
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machine_id: "x".into(),
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entries: vec![ManifestEntry {
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path: "../escape.txt".into(),
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sha256: "00".repeat(32),
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size: 4,
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}],
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};
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craft_bundle_with_manifest(&evil, &manifest);
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// Manifest-only bundle reads back cleanly; dangerous path is
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// visible to `inspect`, giving the caller a safe preview.
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let r = inspect(&evil).unwrap();
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assert!(r.paths.iter().any(|p| p == "../escape.txt"));
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}
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// --- local helpers ---
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fn count_entries(dir: &Path) -> usize {
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fs::read_dir(dir).unwrap().count()
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}
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fn craft_tampered(src: &Path, out: &Path) {
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let rel = "hooks/pre.sh";
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let payload = fs::read(src.join(rel)).unwrap();
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let manifest = HibernateManifest {
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version: MANIFEST_VERSION.to_string(),
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timestamp: 0,
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machine_id: "t".into(),
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entries: vec![ManifestEntry {
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path: rel.into(),
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sha256: "deadbeef".repeat(8), // wrong digest
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size: payload.len() as u64,
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}],
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};
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craft_bundle_with_extra(out, &manifest, rel, &payload);
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}
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