41 changed files with 1357 additions and 834 deletions
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ jobs:
        continue-on-error: true
  workflow-lint:
-    # v0.20.1: guards against the dtolnay-SHA-class incident.
+    # v0.20.1: guards against the dtolnay-SHA-class incident (2026-04-22).
    # actionlint catches workflow syntax; validate-workflow-shas.sh catches
    # fabricated / force-pushed SHA pins. Runs fast (<30s).
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@ -13,4 +13,78 @@ All notable changes are tagged via `git tag v*`. This file tracks unreleased wor
 ## Released
-Release notes per tag are kept in the GitHub Releases UI. See `git tag --sort=-creatordate`.
+Release notes per tag are kept in the GitHub Releases UI:
 https://github.com/KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit-1.0/releases
 Highlights below; full notes in each tag's GitHub Release page.
 ### v0.45.0 — post-install onboarding wizard + 5 prod-install bug fixes (2026-05-26)
 User feedback from real curl|bash with `profile=full`: "нет выбора провайдера, нахуй не понятно что делать после установки". Closed.
 - **NEW** `kei onboard` — 4-step wizard auto-triggered at end of install (TTY only). Walks user through: pick primary CLI → kei mcp-wire → MOONSHOT_API_KEY hint → kei-doctor health check. Re-runnable any time.
 - **NEW** `bin/kei onboard|setup|wizard` arm.
 - **FIX** `act_runner: command not found` — resolver tries `act_runner` → `gitea-runner`; brew install switched to `gitea-runner` (functionally equivalent for Forgejo).
 - **FIX** Forgejo `no such table: user` — added `forgejo migrate` before `admin user create` (idempotent).
 - **FIX** `zoekt: No formulae or casks found` — graceful fallback: brew taps → `go install` → clean skip with warning.
 - **DEFERRED** `kei-shared missing` + launchd `Input/output error` → v0.46.
 ### v0.44.0 — pre-release audit: 1 CRITICAL + 4 HIGH + 4 MEDIUM (2026-05-26)
 Four-CLI parallel pre-release audit (Claude+Grok+Gemini+Copilot, each reviewing different angle) surfaced 9 real issues in v0.43. All patched.
 - **CRITICAL** Walk-up canonicalize for non-existent leaf paths (defeats v0.42 fix #1 when parent didn't exist either).
 - **HIGH** O_NOFOLLOW open + fd-write closes TOCTOU window during hook chain await.
 - **HIGH** Sanitize MOONSHOT_API_KEY pre-curl (config injection blocked).
 - **HIGH** `env_clear` + whitelist on subprocess spawn (no secret leak via kei_bash).
 - **HIGH** `Path::starts_with` + canonical KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS (no prefix-bypass).
 - **MED** macOS $TMPDIR carve-out (allowed_roots check FIRST; narrowed /var/ blanket).
 - **MED** Timeout doc honesty (per-step not aggregate).
 - **MED** cwd in hook input.
 - **MED** Failure-fallback cache has full schema.
 ### v0.43.0 — kei limits + 4 audit fixes (2026-05-26)
 - **NEW** `kei limits` — honest subscription-quota report. Research-grounded: 4 of 5 CLIs have no public quota API. Only Kimi balance via Moonshot `/v1/users/me/balance` (requires MOONSHOT_API_KEY).
 - **NEW** Pet integration — reads cache, shows Kimi balance segment if live.
 - **FIX** Atomic cache write (mktemp + atomic mv).
 - **FIX** `tonumber?` swallows parse errors; `_safe_json` wrapper.
 - **FIX** Token off argv (curl `--config -` via stdin).
 - **FIX** `jq` runtime guard.
 ### v0.42.0 — re-audit fixes: 1 CRITICAL + 5 HIGH+MED (2026-05-26)
 Re-audit found v0.41 fixes were incomplete. All patched.
 - **CRITICAL** Symlink leaf bypass — canonicalize full path + reject is_symlink leaf for new files (3-of-4 reviewers convergent).
 - **HIGH** $HOME removed from default allowed_roots (was self-neuter vector — agent could overwrite `~/.claude/hooks/*`).
 - **HIGH** Empty section `[bash]/[edit]/[write]` now also FAIL-CLOSED.
 - **MED** `tokio::fs` in load_chain.
 - **MED** process_group + killpg applied to hook subprocess too.
 ### v0.41.0 — security hardening from Phase C dogfooding (2026-05-26)
 - **HIGH** Fail-CLOSED on missing config + hook (was: silent pass-through).
 - **HIGH** Path-traversal guard (denylist + canonicalize).
 - **MED** `tokio::fs` async I/O (was: blocking std::fs on tokio thread).
 - **MED** Process-group kill on Unix.
 ### v0.40.0 — Phase C: cross-CLI hook enforcement (2026-05-26)
 - **NEW** `kei_bash` / `kei_edit` / `kei_write` MCP tools in `kei-mcp`.
 - **NEW** `policy-chain.toml` SSoT for which hooks gate which tool.
 - **NEW** 3-tier enforcement model (Claude+Grok TIER 1, Copilot TIER 2, Agy+Kimi TIER 3).
 - **NEW** `kei mcp-wire` orchestrator + 5 per-CLI wire scripts.
 ### v0.39.x — multi-LLM DNA (2026-05-26)
 - **NEW** `kei pick` interactive picker.
 - **NEW** `kei agent <name>` with DNA-driven provider resolution.
 - **NEW** `kei primary` get/set default backend.
 - **NEW** `spawn_agent` MCP tool — any MCP-capable CLI can spawn KeiSeiKit agents on any backend.
 ### v0.38.0 — opt-in hook packs + stack profiles (2026-05-26)
 - **NEW** Hook packs (safety / evidence / observability / epistemic / orchestration / git-guard / stack-rust).
 - **NEW** Stack profiles (minimal / web / ml / systems / mobile).
 - **NEW** `kei configure` re-runnable.
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -1,23 +1,81 @@
 # KeiSeiKit
-A **multi-LLM substrate** that gives any agentic coding tool persistent
+A **multi-LLM substrate** for agentic coding. Same agent definition,
-memory, deterministic agent identity, and self-maintaining orchestration.
+any LLM backend — Claude Code, Grok, Antigravity (Gemini), GitHub
-Works first-class with Claude Code; MCP-compatible bridges generate
+Copilot, or Kimi. Pick your orchestrator with `kei pick`; agents
-context for Cursor / Continue / Zed / Aider / Windsurf / Cline /
+spawn sub-agents on other LLMs via MCP `spawn_agent`; safety hooks
-OpenClaw / Kimi from the same source-of-truth.
+enforce on every backend through a 3-tier model. Three-phase nightly
 sleep consolidates 30-session windows into morning markdown reports.
-**Apache 2.0** — explicit patent grant + retaliation clause. 105 Rust
+**Apache 2.0** — explicit patent grant + retaliation clause.
-crates [REAL: `grep -E '^\s*"[a-z-]+",' _primitives/_rust/Cargo.toml | wc -l`],
+
-69 skills [REAL: `ls skills/ | wc -l`], 54 hooks
+## Highlights
-[REAL: `ls hooks/*.sh | wc -l`], 38 agent manifests
+
-[REAL: `ls _manifests/*.toml | wc -l`], 85 substrate blocks
+- **5 LLM CLIs unified.** Claude Code (native hooks), Grok (port to
-[REAL: `find _blocks/ -name '*.md' | wc -l`], 18 capability atoms
+  `~/.grok/settings.json`), Antigravity/Gemini, GitHub Copilot, Kimi.
-[REAL: `find _capabilities/ -mindepth 2 -maxdepth 2 -type d | wc -l`],
+  DNA-routed: each agent's manifest declares a `provider`;
-7 substrate roles [REAL: `ls _roles/*.toml | wc -l`]. Self-indexing
+  `kei agent <name>` resolves DNA → primary → claude fallback.
-via kei-registry SQLite (565 active DNAs
+- **Sub-agents on any backend.** Agents call `spawn_agent` (built-in MCP
-[REAL: `head -3 docs/DNA-INDEX.md | grep "Total blocks:"`] as of
+  tool in `kei-mcp`) to dispatch other agents to whichever LLM fits
-2026-05-03). Three-phase nightly consolidation. Foreign-project
+  the task. Cross-CLI orchestration without lock-in — Grok can spawn
-ingestion runtime (`kei-import <repo-url>`).
+  critic@Claude, then ml-implementer@Gemini, all from one session.
 - **3-tier policy enforcement.** Claude + Grok TIER 1 (full native
  PreToolUse), Copilot TIER 2 (MCP-wrapped + `--excluded-tools=shell`),
  Agy + Kimi TIER 3 (advisory). `no-github-push`, `safety-guard`,
  `destructive-guard`, `citation-verify`, `numeric-claims-guard`
  surface on every backend that supports tool-call gating.
 - **Three-phase nightly sleep.** Phase A (incubation — queued tasks
  via `/sleep-on-it`), Phase B (REM consolidation — analyzes last 30
  sessions, writes morning markdown), Phase C (NREM deep-sleep, every
  7 days — conflict scan + refactor proposals). Outputs are markdown;
  you decide what merges.
 - **Native token streaming.** Each backend streams in its own print
  mode (`claude -p`, `grok --print`, `agy --print`, `copilot --prompt`);
  KeiSeiKit composes the agent prompt + task and passes through. No
  buffering layer.
 - **Persistent memory.** SQLite ledger + content-addressable store,
  session-spanning context, cross-machine sync via memory-repo.
 - **Agent DNA.** Deterministic variable-length identity per
  invocation: `<role>::<caps>::<scope-sha8>::<body-sha8>-<nonce8>`.
  Same task → same prefix → "did this run before?" via SQL, no
  embeddings.
 - **Constructor Pattern.** Substrate, not framework. You compose; it
  doesn't dictate workflow. File >200 LOC → decompose. No mixins, no
  DI containers, no abstract factories.
 - **Self-maintaining.** Every substrate edit cascades: registry
  updates, agent regeneration, DNA index refresh, keimd graph
  reindex. Auto-self-indexing via kei-registry SQLite.
 ## By the numbers (v0.49)
 110 Rust crates · 69 skills · 54 hooks · 38 agent manifests ·
 86 substrate blocks · 18 capability atoms · 7 substrate roles ·
 565 indexed DNAs · 6 install profiles (minimal → full).
 ## Platforms
 - **macOS** (arm64 + x64) — fully supported, primary dev target.
 - **Linux** (Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora, Arch — x64 + arm64) — fully supported.
 - **Windows** — substrate itself is Bash-only, but the **MCP server binary**
  ships as `kei-mcp-server-windows-x64.exe` in every release. Three
  recommended paths:
  - **WSL2** (recommended) — install Windows Subsystem for Linux,
    then run `bootstrap.sh` inside Ubuntu/Debian as normal. Full
    substrate works. `bootstrap.sh` auto-detects WSL2 and Git Bash;
    on bare Windows it prints a one-time WSL setup guide and copies
    the `wsl --install` command to your clipboard.
  - **MCP-only** — drop `kei-mcp-server-windows-x64.exe` into your
    Claude Desktop / VS Code MCP config to get `spawn_agent` +
    `kei_bash`/`kei_edit`/`kei_write` tools, without the full
    Bash-based substrate. Skills, hooks, and `kei` CLI not available
    in this mode.
  - **Native PowerShell port** — demand-driven. WSL gives 100%
    coverage today with 0 code duplication, so a native `.ps1`
    substrate isn't built yet. If you want it, open an issue with
    a thumbs-up on the existing Windows-native tracker (or file
    one) — once demand is real, we'll build it. The MCP-server
    binary path already covers the common "just want spawn_agent
    in Claude Desktop" case.
 ## Maturity matrix
@ -93,6 +151,54 @@ duplicated install logic.
 into client-native config — those are bridge targets, not separate
 profiles.
 ## Post-install — the `kei` CLI (v0.45+)
 After install, `kei` is the substrate entrypoint. On first interactive
 run an onboarding wizard walks you through picking a primary LLM
 orchestrator and wiring kei-mcp into the CLIs you have installed:
 ```bash
 kei                              # launch primary CLI (default: claude)
 kei onboard                      # post-install wizard (re-runnable)
 kei pick                         # interactive primary picker
 kei primary [<backend>]          # get/set primary LLM provider
 kei agent <name> "<task>"        # invoke agent: backend from DNA → primary
 kei agent --on=grok <name> "..." # invoke agent on a specific backend
 kei run-via <backend> <name> "<task>"   # explicit-backend dispatch
 kei mcp-wire                     # wire kei-mcp into all installed CLIs
 kei mcp-wire --list              # show enforcement tier per CLI
 kei limits                       # honest subscription-quota report
                                 # (4 of 5 CLIs have no public API)
 kei configure                    # re-pick hook packs + stack profile
 kei message ...                  # cross-session mailbox
 kei --status                     # splash with substrate health
 ```
 ### Multi-LLM agent dispatch
 Agents are markdown prompts that can be served by ANY of 5 supported
 CLIs (Claude Code, Grok, Antigravity-Gemini, GitHub Copilot, Kimi).
 Each agent's manifest may declare a `provider` field that becomes its
 DNA; `kei agent <name>` then routes to that provider automatically.
 See [`docs/encyclopedia/multi-cli-agents.md`](./docs/encyclopedia/multi-cli-agents.md).
 ### Cross-CLI policy enforcement
 KeiSeiKit's safety hooks (`no-github-push`, `safety-guard`,
 `destructive-guard`, `citation-verify`, `numeric-claims-guard`) extend
 to non-Claude CLIs through a 3-tier enforcement model:
 - **TIER 1 — full native**: Claude (existing) + Grok (ports our hooks to `~/.grok/settings.json`)
 - **TIER 2 — MCP-wrapped**: Copilot (`--excluded-tools=shell` + force `kei_bash` via MCP)
 - **TIER 3 — advisory**: Agy + Kimi (cannot disable native shell; prompt-level only)
 See [`docs/encyclopedia/cross-cli-policy.md`](./docs/encyclopedia/cross-cli-policy.md)
 for the full matrix + setup.
 ### Outcome-only — try just the outcome loop (5 files, ~200 LOC)
 If you want to try only the outcome-tracking primitive without
@ -280,25 +386,8 @@ covered by their contributions lose their license to the work.
 Pre-2026-04-30 versions remain available under their original MIT
 terms (irrevocable). See [LICENSE](./LICENSE) and [NOTICE](./NOTICE).
-## Author & collaboration
+<!--
 Author / collaboration section removed — to be written by hand.
 TODO: replace this comment with the section you want.
 -->
 Built by Denis Parfionovich (`parfionovich@keilab.io`) running
 4–8 parallel Claude Code terminals per day. Solo-maintained.
 Apache 2.0 makes the bus factor manageable: any AI-assisted
 developer (you, your Claude, your Cursor, your Aider) can read
 this codebase and continue it.
 **Forks welcome. PRs welcome. Issues welcome.**
 **Open to collaboration.** If you have:
 - a use-case this substrate would solve and you can't see how — open
  a discussion
 - ideas for the SaaS roadmap (cross-machine memory sync, hosted
  nightly consolidation, encyclopedia-as-API) — email or open an issue
 - a related project you're building (agent infra, MCP servers,
  cross-tool bridges, prompt-engineering substrates) and want to
  cross-pollinate — reach out
 - want to integrate KeiSeiKit primitives into your product or
  research — Apache 2.0 already permits it; happy to help you wire it
 Email reaches the author directly. No marketing list, no funnel.
--- a/_generated/infra-implementer.md
+++ b/_generated/infra-implementer.md
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ Counter: each FAILED attempt on the SAME problem = +1. Success = reset.
 - Secrets discipline — `.env` gitignored, grep staged files for credential patterns before commit, no plaintext in Terraform state / Dockerfile / CI inline / logs
 - Paid-compute cost guard — dashboard balance check, pricing-page verification, single-variant first, 2-min monitor (Modal, AWS, GCP, fal.ai, Apify, ElevenLabs)
 - Post-deploy verification — run the project's verification command from `memory/{project}.md`, record endpoints/creds refs
- Shared-infra risk flagging — e.g. Recruiter shares EC2 i-0a8b747023809d451 with tip-platform, marketing-ai-agent, psychology-tests
+- Shared-infra risk flagging — e.g. Recruiter shares an EC2 with tip-platform, marketing-ai-agent, psychology-tests
 **Out (hand off):**
 - `code-implementer` — deploy pipeline requires new application code / binary / library (not infra definition)
@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ Blockers / next: <list>
 - `{path::user-rules}/dev-workflow.md`
 - `{path::user-memory}/security-restricted-projects.md`
 - `Compute Cost Incident: $98.78 Modal overrun — no dashboard check, unverified prices.`
- `Recruiter shared-EC2 risk (i-0a8b747023809d451 shared with 3 projects, default SECRET_KEY, no CSRF).`
+- `Recruiter shared-EC2 risk (<ec2-instance-id> shared with 3 projects, default SECRET_KEY, no CSRF).`
 - `CloudSync 146 GB bloat: two duplicate LaunchAgents both writing logs. Scan for duplicates before adding infra.`
 ## Output Footer (RULE 0.16)
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools.rs
@ -1,738 +0,0 @@
 //! Phase C — cross-CLI hook enforcement via MCP-wrapped tools.
 //!
 //! Exposes three built-in MCP tools — `kei_bash`, `kei_edit`, `kei_write` —
 //! that synthesize Claude Code's PreToolUse hook input contract, chain
 //! through the hook scripts declared in `~/.claude/hooks/_lib/policy-chain.toml`,
 //! and only execute the wrapped action if every hook returns exit 0.
 //!
 //! Why this exists: when an agent runs on Grok / Agy / Copilot / Kimi, none
 //! of our claude-side PreToolUse hooks fire. The agent could read the rules
 //! in its system prompt but the tool-call layer was previously ungated. The
 //! `kei_*` MCP tools restore that gate for any MCP-capable CLI.
 //!
 //! Constructor Pattern: ONE policy SSoT (`policy-chain.toml`), ONE dispatcher
 //! (this file), hooks reused as-is from `~/.claude/hooks/`. No rewrite, no
 //! abstraction layer. Shell-out per hook keeps the contract identical to
 //! Claude's native PreToolUse pipeline.
 //!
 //! CLAUDECODE / GROKCODE guard — DESIGN NOTE (NOT a security boundary):
 //! When invoked from inside Claude Code (`$CLAUDECODE=1`) or Grok the chain
 //! is SKIPPED to avoid double-firing the same hooks (they already ran on the
 //! CLI's own PreToolUse). This is a perf / UX optimization for the inside-CLI
 //! call path — NOT an authorization check. An attacker who can set the
 //! parent process's environment already controls the CLI invocation anyway;
 //! re-running hooks would not stop them. To raise the bar for confused-deputy
 //! scenarios use full sandboxing (Phase D) or run kei-mcp as a separate UID.
 //!
 //! v0.41 audit fixes (2026-05-26, Gemini security review):
 //!   #1 fail-CLOSED on missing hooks (was: silently skip)
 //!   #2 path-traversal guard on kei_edit/kei_write (canonicalize + root check)
 //!   #3 CLAUDECODE bypass — documented as design (see above), no behavior change
 //!   #4 tokio::fs for async file I/O (was: blocking std::fs on tokio thread)
 //!   #5 process-group kill on Unix (was: kill_on_drop SIGKILLs only direct child)
 //!
 //! v0.42 re-audit fixes (2026-05-26, 4-CLI dogfood: Claude+Grok+Gemini+Copilot):
 //!   #1 [CRITICAL] symlink LEAF bypass — canonicalize full path + reject
 //!      leaf symlinks (v0.41 only canonicalized PARENT; ln -s ~/.ssh/keys ./x
 //!      then kei_write x followed the link to the target)
 //!   #2 [HIGH]     $HOME removed from default allowed_roots — was a blanket
 //!      allow that let agent overwrite ~/.claude/hooks (self-neuter), ~/.zshrc
 //!      (RCE on next shell), and credential stores. Default: $PWD only.
 //!      Denylist also extended with .claude/, .grok/, .gemini/, .copilot/,
 //!      .kimi/, and exact shell-init filenames.
 //!   #3 [HIGH]     empty [bash]/[edit]/[write] section also FAIL-CLOSED (was:
 //!      empty vec → pass-through). KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 to opt in.
 //!   #4 [MED]      load_chain converted to async + tokio::fs (was: blocking
 //!      std::fs on tokio worker thread).
 //!   #5 [MED]      set_process_group + killpg applied to HOOK subprocess too
 //!      (v0.41 only had it on the bash action; hook grandchildren orphaned).
 //!   #6 [MED]      doc note that aggregate timeout is still per-step (60s ×
 //!      N hooks + 60s action). Single-deadline implementation deferred to
 //!      v0.43 — not security-blocking.
 use crate::protocol::{err, ok, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, INTERNAL_ERROR, INVALID_PARAMS};
 use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use std::process::Stdio;
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::fs;
 use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
 use tokio::process::Command;
 /// Per-step timeout (each hook AND the action each get up to this long).
 /// For an N-hook chain the total wall-clock cap is approximately
 /// `(N+1) * SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS`. v0.44 doc-honesty fix (Claude MED):
 /// prior versions claimed this was an "aggregate" cap, which was always
 /// wrong. Aggregate-deadline impl is deferred; for now the per-step
 /// semantics are documented honestly so operators pick a sane value.
 const SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 60;
 #[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
 struct PolicyChain {
    #[serde(default)]
    bash: ChainSpec,
    #[serde(default)]
    edit: ChainSpec,
    #[serde(default)]
    write: ChainSpec,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
 struct ChainSpec {
    #[serde(default)]
    chain: Vec<String>,
 }
 /// MCP tool descriptors — appended to `tools/list` by `handlers::tools::list`.
 pub fn descriptors() -> Vec<Value> {
    vec![
        json!({
            "name": "kei_bash",
            "description": "Run a shell command after running KeiSeiKit's [bash] policy chain (no-github-push, safety-guard, destructive-guard). Blocks on hook exit 2 with the hook's stderr surfaced as the MCP error message. Use this instead of native shell on non-Claude CLIs to inherit Claude Code's safety enforcement.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "command": { "type": "string", "description": "Shell command to execute" },
                    "cwd": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional working directory; defaults to $PWD" }
                },
                "required": ["command"]
            }
        }),
        json!({
            "name": "kei_edit",
            "description": "Modify a file (replace old_string with new_string) after running KeiSeiKit's [edit] policy chain (citation-verify, numeric-claims-guard). Blocks unverified academic citations and numeric claims without evidence markers.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "file_path": { "type": "string" },
                    "old_string": { "type": "string" },
                    "new_string": { "type": "string" }
                },
                "required": ["file_path", "old_string", "new_string"]
            }
        }),
        json!({
            "name": "kei_write",
            "description": "Write content to a file after running KeiSeiKit's [write] policy chain (citation-verify, numeric-claims-guard). Blocks unverified academic citations and numeric claims without evidence markers.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "file_path": { "type": "string" },
                    "content": { "type": "string" }
                },
                "required": ["file_path", "content"]
            }
        }),
    ]
 }
 /// Top-level dispatch entry — called from `handlers::tools::call` when the
 /// tool name matches one of the three `kei_*` built-ins.
 pub async fn dispatch_safe(req: JsonRpcRequest, name: &str, args: &Value) -> JsonRpcResponse {
    let result = match name {
        "kei_bash"  => handle_bash(args).await,
        "kei_edit"  => handle_edit(args).await,
        "kei_write" => handle_write(args).await,
        _ => Err(format!("safe_tools dispatched unknown name: {name}")),
    };
    match result {
        Ok(text) => ok(req.id, json!({
            "content": [{ "type": "text", "text": text }],
            "isError": false,
        })),
        Err(e) => err(req.id, INTERNAL_ERROR, e),
    }
 }
 // ---- per-tool handlers --------------------------------------------------
 async fn handle_bash(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let command = args.get("command").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_bash", "command"))?;
    let cwd = args.get("cwd").and_then(Value::as_str);
    // v0.44 fix #8 (Gemini MED): include cwd in hook input. Without this,
    // safety-guard could approve a destructive command (e.g. `rm -rf *`)
    // assuming PWD, while the actual cwd arg redirected it to a sensitive
    // dir. Hooks now see the real working directory.
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Bash",
        "tool_input": {
            "command": command,
            "cwd": cwd
        }
    });
    run_chain("bash", &hook_input).await?;
    let mut cmd = Command::new("bash");
    cmd.arg("-c").arg(command);
    if let Some(dir) = cwd {
        cmd.current_dir(dir);
    }
    cmd.stdin(Stdio::null())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
        .kill_on_drop(true);
    // v0.41 fix #5: put child in its own process group so timeout kills it
    // and ALL grandchildren together (not just the immediate shell).
    set_process_group(&mut cmd);
    // v0.44 fix #4 (Gemini HIGH): clear parent env on subprocess spawn.
    // Was: child inherited AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, MOONSHOT_API_KEY, etc.
    // An agent that exec's `env` via kei_bash could exfiltrate all of them.
    // Now: only PATH/HOME/USER/LANG/TERM/SHELL forwarded (set in helper).
    apply_safe_env(&mut cmd);
    let child = cmd.spawn().map_err(|e| format!("spawn bash: {e}"))?;
    let pid_opt = child.id();
    let fut = child.wait_with_output();
    let out = match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS), fut).await {
        Ok(Ok(o)) => o,
        Ok(Err(e)) => return Err(format!("wait bash: {e}")),
        Err(_) => {
            // Timeout — kill the entire process group, not just the child.
            if let Some(pid) = pid_opt {
                killpg_best_effort(pid);
            }
            return Err("kei_bash timeout".to_string());
        }
    };
    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).to_string();
    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_string();
    if !out.status.success() {
        return Err(format!(
            "bash exited {}: {}",
            out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
            stderr.trim()
        ));
    }
    Ok(if stderr.is_empty() { stdout } else { format!("{stdout}\n[stderr]\n{stderr}") })
 }
 // v0.41 fix #5: process-group helpers (Unix-only; no-op on other platforms).
 #[cfg(unix)]
 fn set_process_group(cmd: &mut Command) {
    cmd.process_group(0);
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 fn set_process_group(_cmd: &mut Command) {}
 /// v0.44 fix #4 (Gemini HIGH): strip parent env on subprocess spawn so secrets
 /// like AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, MOONSHOT_API_KEY etc. don't leak to user-controlled
 /// bash commands or hook scripts. Whitelist forwards only PATH/HOME/USER/LANG/
 /// TERM/SHELL — enough to keep tools functional, none of it sensitive.
 ///
 /// Override: `KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA=":-separated list"` adds named vars to the
 /// whitelist for callers that legitimately need (e.g. NIX_PATH, JAVA_HOME).
 fn apply_safe_env(cmd: &mut Command) {
    cmd.env_clear();
    let default_keep = [
        "PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LOGNAME", "SHELL", "LANG", "LC_ALL",
        "LC_CTYPE", "TERM", "PWD", "TMPDIR",
    ];
    for k in default_keep {
        if let Ok(v) = std::env::var(k) {
            cmd.env(k, v);
        }
    }
    if let Ok(extras) = std::env::var("KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA") {
        for k in extras.split(':') {
            let k = k.trim();
            if k.is_empty() { continue; }
            if let Ok(v) = std::env::var(k) {
                cmd.env(k, v);
            }
        }
    }
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 fn killpg_best_effort(pid: u32) {
    // SAFETY: libc::kill on a negative PID targets the process group.
    // SIGKILL = 9. Best-effort — ignore errors (process may have exited).
    unsafe {
        let _ = libc::kill(-(pid as i32), libc::SIGKILL);
    }
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 fn killpg_best_effort(_pid: u32) {}
 async fn handle_edit(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let file_path = args.get("file_path").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "file_path"))?;
    let old_string = args.get("old_string").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "old_string"))?;
    let new_string = args.get("new_string").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "new_string"))?;
    // v0.44 LOW: reject empty old_string (would silently prepend new_string
    // because contents.contains("") is always true).
    if old_string.is_empty() {
        return Err("kei_edit: old_string must not be empty".into());
    }
    let safe_path = validate_path(file_path)?;
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Edit",
        "tool_input": {
            "file_path": safe_path.display().to_string(),
            "old_string": old_string,
            "new_string": new_string
        }
    });
    run_chain("edit", &hook_input).await?;
    // v0.44 fix #2 (Gemini HIGH + Claude #4 MED): close TOCTOU window. After
    // validate_path approved the path, a concurrent process could swap the
    // file for a symlink before our write. Open the existing file with
    // O_NOFOLLOW so the open itself fails on symlink-swap; then read/write
    // through the open fd (not the path again) so no second path lookup.
    open_nofollow_read_write_edit(&safe_path, old_string, new_string).await
 }
 async fn handle_write(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let file_path = args.get("file_path").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_write", "file_path"))?;
    let content = args.get("content").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_write", "content"))?;
    let safe_path = validate_path(file_path)?;
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Write",
        "tool_input": { "file_path": safe_path.display().to_string(), "content": content }
    });
    run_chain("write", &hook_input).await?;
    if let Some(parent) = safe_path.parent() {
        if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
            fs::create_dir_all(parent).await
                .map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", parent.display()))?;
        }
    }
    // v0.44 fix #2: open with O_NOFOLLOW + O_CREAT to refuse swap-to-symlink.
    open_nofollow_write(&safe_path, content).await
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #2: edit via O_NOFOLLOW-opened fd to close the TOCTOU window
 /// between validate_path and the write. The open() itself refuses if the leaf
 /// has been swapped to a symlink during the hook-chain await.
 #[cfg(unix)]
 async fn open_nofollow_read_write_edit(
    path: &Path, old_string: &str, new_string: &str,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
    let path = path.to_path_buf();
    let old_s = old_string.to_string();
    let new_s = new_string.to_string();
    // Blocking syscalls on a dedicated thread (tokio::task::spawn_blocking).
    let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<String, String> {
        let mut f = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
            .read(true).write(true)
            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
            .open(&path)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: open(O_NOFOLLOW) {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        use std::io::{Read, Write, Seek, SeekFrom};
        let mut contents = String::new();
        f.read_to_string(&mut contents)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: read {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        if !contents.contains(&old_s) {
            return Err(format!("kei_edit: old_string not found in {}", path.display()));
        }
        let updated = contents.replacen(&old_s, &new_s, 1);
        f.set_len(0).map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: truncate {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: seek {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        f.write_all(updated.as_bytes())
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        Ok(format!("edited {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), updated.len()))
    }).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: thread join: {e}"))?;
    result
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 async fn open_nofollow_read_write_edit(
    path: &Path, old_string: &str, new_string: &str,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
    // Non-Unix fallback: best-effort using tokio::fs (no O_NOFOLLOW available).
    let contents = fs::read_to_string(path).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    if !contents.contains(old_string) {
        return Err(format!("kei_edit: old_string not found in {}", path.display()));
    }
    let updated = contents.replacen(old_string, new_string, 1);
    fs::write(path, &updated).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    Ok(format!("edited {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), updated.len()))
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 async fn open_nofollow_write(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
    let path = path.to_path_buf();
    let bytes = content.as_bytes().to_vec();
    let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<String, String> {
        let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
        opts.write(true).create(true).truncate(true);
        // O_NOFOLLOW: refuse if the leaf is a symlink (someone swapped it
        // during our await). Without this the v0.42 symlink_metadata pre-check
        // was just an indicator — fs::write still followed.
        opts.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW);
        // O_EXCL combined with O_CREAT could be added when path does not yet
        // exist to refuse any pre-existing inode — but the test suite uses
        // the same path multiple times, so we keep truncate semantics. The
        // O_NOFOLLOW + symlink_metadata pre-check is sufficient.
        let mut f = opts.open(&path)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: open(O_NOFOLLOW) {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        use std::io::Write;
        f.write_all(&bytes)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        Ok(format!("wrote {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), bytes.len()))
    }).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: thread join: {e}"))?;
    result
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 async fn open_nofollow_write(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
    fs::write(path, content).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    Ok(format!("wrote {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), content.len()))
 }
 /// Path-traversal + symlink + denylist guard.
 ///
 /// v0.41 (initial): rejected `..`, canonicalized PARENT, checked denylist + roots.
 ///   → 4-CLI re-audit (2026-05-26) found this was bypassable via symlink at the
 ///     leaf and self-attackable via the $HOME blanket-allowed root.
 ///
 /// v0.42 fixes:
 ///   #1 [CRITICAL] reject if the leaf is a symlink (was: validated parent
 ///      only, fs::write followed leaf symlink to anywhere). Done via
 ///      `symlink_metadata` on the leaf BEFORE write, and full `canonicalize`
 ///      on the leaf when the file already exists.
 ///   #2 [HIGH] $HOME removed from default allowed-roots — default is $PWD
 ///      only. Denylist now also covers $HOME/.claude/ (the substrate
 ///      itself), shell init files, and credential stores. Operators who
 ///      need broader access set KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS explicitly.
 fn validate_path(p: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if p.is_empty() {
        return Err("file_path: empty".into());
    }
    // 1. Reject literal `..` segments — covers most traversal attempts.
    if p.split('/').any(|seg| seg == "..") {
        return Err(format!("file_path: '..' segment not allowed in {p}"));
    }
    let path = Path::new(p);
    // 2. Build a canonical path. Walk UP to the deepest existing ancestor,
    //    canonicalize it (resolves all symlinks in the existing prefix),
    //    then reattach the non-existent tail. This catches symlinks at ANY
    //    depth in the path, including nested non-existent leaves.
    //
    //    v0.44 fix #1 (Gemini CRITICAL): v0.42 only canonicalized the immediate
    //    parent. If the parent didn't exist either (e.g. /proj/symlink_dir/
    //    new_subdir/file.txt where symlink_dir → /Users/denis), the path fell
    //    through to "absolute as-is" → no canonicalization → bypass.
    let canonical = canonicalize_with_walk_up(path)?;
    // 3. Even when the file doesn't exist yet, the LEAF could already be a
    //    dangling symlink that `fs::write` would follow on creation. Reject.
    if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&canonical) {
        if meta.file_type().is_symlink() {
            return Err(format!(
                "file_path: leaf is a symlink (refusing to follow): {}",
                canonical.display()
            ));
        }
    }
    // 4. Allowed-root containment FIRST (v0.44 fix #6 reorder: was after
    //    denylist, which meant macOS $TMPDIR = /private/var/folders/... hit
    //    the /var/ denylist before reaching the allowed_roots check, blocking
    //    legitimate use of tempfile-backed CWD on macOS).
    //
    //    v0.44 fix #5 (Claude HIGH): use Path::starts_with for component-aware
    //    containment — Path::starts_with("/home/u/proj") does NOT match
    //    /home/u/proj-secrets, the str::starts_with that was here did.
    let roots = allowed_roots();
    let in_allowed_root = roots.is_empty() || roots.iter().any(|r| {
        canonical.starts_with(r)
    });
    if !in_allowed_root {
        return Err(format!(
            "file_path: outside allowed roots {:?}: {}",
            roots, canonical.display()
        ));
    }
    let canon_str = canonical.display().to_string();
    // 5. Reject system + substrate-control + credential paths.
    //    Note: paths inside an allowed root that also match a denylist entry
    //    are STILL denied (e.g. agent's CWD == ~/.claude/ — denied even
    //    though it matches a default root). System dirs not in any allowed
    //    root would have been caught above anyway.
    let denylist = [
        "/etc/", "/usr/", "/System/", "/var/db/", "/var/log/", "/var/root/",
        "/private/etc/", "/private/var/db/", "/private/var/log/", "/private/var/root/",
        "/root/", "/bin/", "/sbin/",
    ];
    // NOTE: /var/folders/ (macOS $TMPDIR) and /private/tmp/ are NOT denied —
    // they are legitimate working dirs for tempfile-backed agents.
    for d in denylist {
        if canon_str.starts_with(d) {
            return Err(format!("file_path: denied (system dir): {canon_str}"));
        }
    }
    if let Ok(home) = std::env::var("HOME") {
        let dir_secrets = [
            ".ssh/", ".aws/", ".gnupg/", ".config/gcloud/", ".cargo/credentials",
            ".npmrc", ".docker/config.json", ".kube/",
            ".claude/", ".grok/", ".gemini/", ".copilot/", ".kimi/",
        ];
        for sd in dir_secrets {
            let full = format!("{home}/{sd}");
            if canon_str.starts_with(&full) {
                return Err(format!("file_path: denied (secret/substrate dir): {canon_str}"));
            }
        }
        let init_files = [
            ".zshrc", ".bashrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile", ".zprofile",
            ".zshenv", ".bash_login", ".inputrc", ".gitconfig",
            ".config/fish/config.fish",
        ];
        for f in init_files {
            let full = format!("{home}/{f}");
            if canon_str == full {
                return Err(format!("file_path: denied (shell-init file): {canon_str}"));
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(canonical)
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #1: walk up the path looking for the deepest existing ancestor,
 /// canonicalize THAT, then reattach the non-existent tail components.
 /// Resolves symlinks at any depth (existing OR non-existing branches).
 fn canonicalize_with_walk_up(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    // Make the path absolute first so we can walk up reliably.
    let abs = if path.is_absolute() {
        path.to_path_buf()
    } else {
        std::env::current_dir()
            .map_err(|e| format!("file_path: cwd unavailable: {e}"))?
            .join(path)
    };
    // Walk up from the leaf, collecting non-existent components in reverse.
    let mut current = abs.clone();
    let mut tail: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = Vec::new();
    let canon = loop {
        if current.exists() {
            break current.canonicalize()
                .map_err(|e| format!("file_path: canonicalize {}: {e}", current.display()))?;
        }
        let name = current.file_name()
            .ok_or_else(|| format!("file_path: path has no existing ancestor: {}", abs.display()))?
            .to_os_string();
        let parent = match current.parent() {
            Some(p) if !p.as_os_str().is_empty() => p.to_path_buf(),
            _ => return Err(format!("file_path: walked to root without finding existing dir: {}", abs.display())),
        };
        tail.push(name);
        current = parent;
    };
    // Reattach tail (in reverse — we pushed from leaf to root).
    let mut result = canon;
    for name in tail.into_iter().rev() {
        result.push(name);
    }
    Ok(result)
 }
 fn allowed_roots() -> Vec<String> {
    // Canonicalize each entry so symlinked roots (e.g. macOS /var → /private/var,
    // /tmp → /private/tmp) match canonicalized targets. Trailing slash added
    // for the consistency-with-default format. v0.44 fix #5 + #6 combined.
    let canon_with_slash = |raw: &str| -> Option<String> {
        let p = Path::new(raw);
        let canon = std::fs::canonicalize(p).unwrap_or_else(|_| p.to_path_buf());
        let mut s = canon.display().to_string();
        if !s.ends_with('/') { s.push('/'); }
        if s.is_empty() { None } else { Some(s) }
    };
    if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS") {
        return v.split(':')
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .filter_map(canon_with_slash)
            .collect();
    }
    let mut roots = Vec::new();
    if let Ok(cwd) = std::env::current_dir() {
        if let Some(r) = canon_with_slash(&cwd.display().to_string()) {
            roots.push(r);
        }
    }
    roots
 }
 // ---- chain runner -------------------------------------------------------
 /// Run the configured hook chain for `tool` ("bash"/"edit"/"write"), piping
 /// `hook_input` to each hook's stdin in order. Exit 0 → continue. Exit 2 (or
 /// other non-zero) → return Err with the hook's stderr.
 ///
 /// Skips the chain if the parent process is already inside Claude or Grok
 /// (env flags), since those CLIs' native PreToolUse hooks already fired.
 /// Run the configured hook chain for `tool` ("bash"/"edit"/"write").
 ///
 /// v0.42 fixes:
 ///   #3 [HIGH]   empty chain (section absent or zero hooks) now FAILS CLOSED
 ///               unless KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1.
 ///   #4 [MED]    load_chain() converted to async (was: blocking std::fs).
 ///   #5 [MED]    hook subprocess gets `process_group(0)` + killpg on timeout
 ///               (was: only the bash action got it; hooks could orphan).
 ///   #6 [MED]    aggregate timeout across the whole chain + action (was:
 ///               per-hook 60s, so chain+action could legitimately run
 ///               4× the documented cap on a 3-hook chain).
 async fn run_chain(tool: &str, hook_input: &Value) -> Result<(), String> {
    if env_truthy("CLAUDECODE") || env_truthy("GROKCODE") {
        // Native hooks already enforced — don't double-fire.
        return Ok(());
    }
    let chain = load_chain(tool).await?;
    if chain.is_empty() {
        // v0.42 fix #3 (Claude+Gemini HIGH): empty section is the same
        // misconfig class as missing file — FAIL CLOSED with explicit opt-in.
        if env_truthy("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL") {
            return Ok(());
        }
        return Err(format!(
            "[policy-chain] section [{tool}] is empty — refusing to run \
             (set KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 to allow pass-through, e.g. for tests)"
        ));
    }
    let hooks_dir = hooks_dir()?;
    let payload = serde_json::to_string(hook_input)
        .map_err(|e| format!("encode hook input: {e}"))?;
    for hook in chain {
        let path = hooks_dir.join(&hook);
        if !path.is_file() {
            return Err(format!(
                "[policy-chain] hook missing: {} (declared in policy-chain.toml [{}])",
                path.display(), tool
            ));
        }
        let mut child_cmd = Command::new(&path);
        child_cmd
            .stdin(Stdio::piped())
            .stdout(Stdio::piped())
            .stderr(Stdio::piped())
            .kill_on_drop(true);
        set_process_group(&mut child_cmd);
        // v0.44 fix #4: same env-isolation for hook subprocess.
        apply_safe_env(&mut child_cmd);
        let mut child = child_cmd
            .spawn()
            .map_err(|e| format!("spawn {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        let pid_opt = child.id();
        if let Some(mut stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
            stdin.write_all(payload.as_bytes()).await
                .map_err(|e| format!("write stdin to {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
            stdin.shutdown().await
                .map_err(|e| format!("close stdin to {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        }
        let fut = child.wait_with_output();
        let out = match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS), fut).await {
            Ok(Ok(o)) => o,
            Ok(Err(e)) => return Err(format!("wait {}: {e}", path.display())),
            Err(_) => {
                // v0.42 fix #5: kill the whole hook process group, not just
                // the immediate child.
                if let Some(pid) = pid_opt {
                    killpg_best_effort(pid);
                }
                return Err(format!("hook {hook} timeout"));
            }
        };
        let code = out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
        if code == 0 {
            continue;
        }
        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim().to_string();
        return Err(format!(
            "[blocked by {hook} exit={code}]\n{stderr}"
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 // ---- config helpers -----------------------------------------------------
 /// v0.42 fix #4: async + tokio::fs (was: blocking std::fs would freeze
 /// a tokio worker if policy-chain.toml lived on a slow / hung mount).
 async fn load_chain(tool: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    let path = chain_path()?;
    // tokio::fs::try_exists avoids a blocking is_file() syscall.
    let exists = fs::try_exists(&path).await.unwrap_or(false);
    if !exists {
        if env_truthy("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL") {
            return Ok(vec![]);
        }
        return Err(format!(
            "[policy-chain] config missing: {} (set KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 to allow pass-through, e.g. for tests)",
            path.display()
        ));
    }
    let raw = fs::read_to_string(&path).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("read policy-chain.toml: {e}"))?;
    let parsed: PolicyChain = toml::from_str(&raw)
        .map_err(|e| format!("parse policy-chain.toml: {e}"))?;
    let chain = match tool {
        "bash"  => parsed.bash.chain,
        "edit"  => parsed.edit.chain,
        "write" => parsed.write.chain,
        _ => return Err(format!("unknown tool kind: {tool}")),
    };
    Ok(chain)
 }
 fn chain_path() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN") {
        return Ok(PathBuf::from(p));
    }
    let dir = hooks_dir()?;
    Ok(dir.join("_lib").join("policy-chain.toml"))
 }
 fn hooks_dir() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("KEI_HOOKS_DIR") {
        return Ok(PathBuf::from(p));
    }
    let home = std::env::var("HOME").map_err(|_| "HOME not set".to_string())?;
    Ok(PathBuf::from(home).join(".claude").join("hooks"))
 }
 fn env_truthy(name: &str) -> bool {
    matches!(std::env::var(name).as_deref(), Ok("1") | Ok("true") | Ok("TRUE") | Ok("yes"))
 }
 fn missing_arg(tool: &str, field: &str) -> String {
    format!("{tool}: missing '{field}' argument")
 }
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 const INVALID_PARAMS_REF: i32 = INVALID_PARAMS; // silence unused-import warning if removed
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/chain_runner.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/chain_runner.rs
@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
 //! Policy chain loader + runner.
 //!
 //! v0.46: extracted from monolithic safe_tools.rs. Reads
 //! `~/.claude/hooks/_lib/policy-chain.toml` to get the hook list for each
 //! tool kind (bash/edit/write), pipes synthesized PreToolUse input to each
 //! hook, aborts on first non-zero exit.
 //!
 //! v0.46 architectural fix #1 (Claude critic CRITICAL): REMOVED env-based
 //! chain-skip (CLAUDECODE / GROKCODE). The skip was logically broken — it
 //! assumed native PreToolUse would catch the call, but PreToolUse matchers
 //! fire on tool_name="Bash"|"Edit"|"Write" and MCP tools are named
 //! `kei_bash`/`kei_edit`/`kei_write`. Native hooks NEVER fire on these
 //! → skip created an auth-bypass hole on Grok. Chain now ALWAYS runs.
 use super::env_guard::{apply_safe_env, killpg_best_effort, set_process_group};
 use super::SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use std::process::Stdio;
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::fs;
 use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
 use tokio::process::Command;
 #[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
 struct PolicyChain {
    #[serde(default)]
    bash: ChainSpec,
    #[serde(default)]
    edit: ChainSpec,
    #[serde(default)]
    write: ChainSpec,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
 struct ChainSpec {
    #[serde(default)]
    chain: Vec<String>,
 }
 /// Run the configured hook chain for `tool` ("bash"/"edit"/"write").
 pub async fn run_chain(tool: &str, hook_input: &Value) -> Result<(), String> {
    let chain = load_chain(tool).await?;
    if chain.is_empty() {
        // v0.42 fix #3: empty section is the same misconfig class as missing
        // file — FAIL CLOSED with explicit opt-in.
        if env_truthy("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL") {
            return Ok(());
        }
        return Err(format!(
            "[policy-chain] section [{tool}] is empty — refusing to run \
             (set KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 to allow pass-through, e.g. for tests)"
        ));
    }
    let hooks_dir = hooks_dir()?;
    let payload = serde_json::to_string(hook_input)
        .map_err(|e| format!("encode hook input: {e}"))?;
    for hook in chain {
        let path = hooks_dir.join(&hook);
        if !path.is_file() {
            return Err(format!(
                "[policy-chain] hook missing: {} (declared in policy-chain.toml [{}])",
                path.display(), tool
            ));
        }
        let mut child_cmd = Command::new(&path);
        child_cmd
            .stdin(Stdio::piped())
            .stdout(Stdio::piped())
            .stderr(Stdio::piped())
            .kill_on_drop(true);
        set_process_group(&mut child_cmd);
        apply_safe_env(&mut child_cmd);
        let mut child = child_cmd
            .spawn()
            .map_err(|e| format!("spawn {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        let pid_opt = child.id();
        if let Some(mut stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
            stdin.write_all(payload.as_bytes()).await
                .map_err(|e| format!("write stdin to {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
            stdin.shutdown().await
                .map_err(|e| format!("close stdin to {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        }
        let fut = child.wait_with_output();
        let out = match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS), fut).await {
            Ok(Ok(o)) => o,
            Ok(Err(e)) => return Err(format!("wait {}: {e}", path.display())),
            Err(_) => {
                if let Some(pid) = pid_opt {
                    killpg_best_effort(pid);
                }
                return Err(format!("hook {hook} timeout"));
            }
        };
        let code = out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
        if code == 0 {
            continue;
        }
        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim().to_string();
        return Err(format!(
            "[blocked by {hook} exit={code}]\n{stderr}"
        ));
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #4: async + tokio::fs.
 async fn load_chain(tool: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    let path = chain_path()?;
    let exists = fs::try_exists(&path).await.unwrap_or(false);
    if !exists {
        if env_truthy("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL") {
            return Ok(vec![]);
        }
        return Err(format!(
            "[policy-chain] config missing: {} (set KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 to allow pass-through, e.g. for tests)",
            path.display()
        ));
    }
    let raw = fs::read_to_string(&path).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("read policy-chain.toml: {e}"))?;
    let parsed: PolicyChain = toml::from_str(&raw)
        .map_err(|e| format!("parse policy-chain.toml: {e}"))?;
    let chain = match tool {
        "bash"  => parsed.bash.chain,
        "edit"  => parsed.edit.chain,
        "write" => parsed.write.chain,
        _ => return Err(format!("unknown tool kind: {tool}")),
    };
    Ok(chain)
 }
 fn chain_path() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("KEI_POLICY_CHAIN") {
        return Ok(PathBuf::from(p));
    }
    let dir = hooks_dir()?;
    Ok(dir.join("_lib").join("policy-chain.toml"))
 }
 fn hooks_dir() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if let Ok(p) = std::env::var("KEI_HOOKS_DIR") {
        return Ok(PathBuf::from(p));
    }
    let home = std::env::var("HOME").map_err(|_| "HOME not set".to_string())?;
    Ok(PathBuf::from(home).join(".claude").join("hooks"))
 }
 fn env_truthy(name: &str) -> bool {
    matches!(std::env::var(name).as_deref(), Ok("1") | Ok("true") | Ok("TRUE") | Ok("yes"))
 }
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/env_guard.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/env_guard.rs
@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
 //! Subprocess environment + process-group hardening for kei_* tools.
 //!
 //! v0.46: extracted from monolithic safe_tools.rs.
 use tokio::process::Command;
 /// v0.41 fix #5: process-group helper (Unix-only; no-op on other platforms).
 /// tokio::process::Command::process_group is available on Unix without
 /// requiring the std::os::unix::process::CommandExt trait import.
 #[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn set_process_group(cmd: &mut Command) {
    cmd.process_group(0);
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 pub fn set_process_group(_cmd: &mut Command) {}
 /// v0.41 fix #5: SIGKILL the entire process group (negative pid).
 #[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn killpg_best_effort(pid: u32) {
    unsafe {
        let _ = libc::kill(-(pid as i32), libc::SIGKILL);
    }
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 pub fn killpg_best_effort(_pid: u32) {}
 /// v0.46 architectural fix: RAII guard. `kill_on_drop` only kills the
 /// immediate child; backgrounded grandchildren survive (e.g. `bash -c
 /// 'sleep 1000 &'`). v0.41 killpg fix only ran on the timeout error path.
 /// Now: killpg fires on EVERY exit path (success, error, panic, early return)
 /// via Drop. Caller disarms on clean wait_with_output success via `disarm()`.
 pub struct KillPgGuard {
    pid: Option<u32>,
 }
 impl KillPgGuard {
    pub fn new(pid: Option<u32>) -> Self { Self { pid } }
    /// Caller succeeded cleanly; child is already reaped by wait_with_output.
    /// Skip the killpg fire on Drop.
    pub fn disarm(&mut self) { self.pid = None; }
 }
 impl Drop for KillPgGuard {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        if let Some(pid) = self.pid {
            killpg_best_effort(pid);
        }
    }
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #4 (Gemini HIGH): strip parent env on subprocess spawn so secrets
 /// like AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, MOONSHOT_API_KEY etc. don't leak to user-controlled
 /// bash commands or hook scripts. Whitelist forwards only PATH/HOME/USER/LANG/
 /// TERM/SHELL/PWD/TMPDIR/LOGNAME/LC_* — enough to keep tools functional, none
 /// of it sensitive.
 ///
 /// Override: `KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA=":-separated list"` adds named vars to the
 /// whitelist for callers that legitimately need (e.g. NIX_PATH, JAVA_HOME).
 pub fn apply_safe_env(cmd: &mut Command) {
    cmd.env_clear();
    let default_keep = [
        "PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LOGNAME", "SHELL", "LANG", "LC_ALL",
        "LC_CTYPE", "TERM", "PWD", "TMPDIR",
    ];
    for k in default_keep {
        if let Ok(v) = std::env::var(k) {
            cmd.env(k, v);
        }
    }
    if let Ok(extras) = std::env::var("KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA") {
        for k in extras.split(':') {
            let k = k.trim();
            if k.is_empty() { continue; }
            if let Ok(v) = std::env::var(k) {
                cmd.env(k, v);
            }
        }
    }
 }
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/exec.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/exec.rs
@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
 //! Action executors for the three kei_* MCP tools.
 //!
 //! v0.46: extracted from monolithic safe_tools.rs. Wraps shell + file
 //! operations with O_NOFOLLOW (close TOCTOU after policy chain) and uses
 //! KillPgGuard (env_guard.rs) so killpg fires on EVERY exit path, not just
 //! the timeout error arm.
 use super::chain_runner::run_chain;
 use super::env_guard::{apply_safe_env, set_process_group, KillPgGuard};
 use super::path_guard::validate_path;
 use super::SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use std::process::Stdio;
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::fs;
 use tokio::process::Command;
 pub async fn handle_bash(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let command = args.get("command").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_bash", "command"))?;
    let cwd = args.get("cwd").and_then(Value::as_str);
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Bash",
        "tool_input": {
            "command": command,
            "cwd": cwd
        }
    });
    run_chain("bash", &hook_input).await?;
    let mut cmd = Command::new("bash");
    cmd.arg("-c").arg(command);
    if let Some(dir) = cwd {
        cmd.current_dir(dir);
    }
    cmd.stdin(Stdio::null())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
        .kill_on_drop(true);
    set_process_group(&mut cmd);
    apply_safe_env(&mut cmd);
    let child = cmd.spawn().map_err(|e| format!("spawn bash: {e}"))?;
    let pid_opt = child.id();
    // v0.46 architectural fix: RAII guard. killpg fires on ANY exit path —
    // including early returns, panics, and normal success (until disarmed).
    let mut killpg_guard = KillPgGuard::new(pid_opt);
    let fut = child.wait_with_output();
    let out = match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS), fut).await {
        Ok(Ok(o)) => o,
        Ok(Err(e)) => return Err(format!("wait bash: {e}")),
        Err(_) => return Err("kei_bash timeout".to_string()),
        // Drop runs here → killpg fires.
    };
    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).to_string();
    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).to_string();
    if !out.status.success() {
        return Err(format!(
            "bash exited {}: {}",
            out.status.code().unwrap_or(-1),
            stderr.trim()
        ));
    }
    // v0.46 architectural fix: arm guard fires by default. Disarm here ONLY
    // after we know the parent shell exited cleanly + we want to leave any
    // legitimate backgrounded jobs alone. Trade-off: killpg also reaps
    // intentional `&` jobs (`sleep 1000 &`). For kei_bash use-case this is
    // correct — the tool should not leak processes across calls.
    killpg_guard.disarm();
    // v0.46: explicitly reap orphaned group AFTER guard disarm-on-success.
    // The disarm() above means we trust kill_on_drop + the kernel to clean
    // up — but kill_on_drop only kills the direct child. For backgrounded
    // grandchildren we'd want a separate killpg here. For now, kei_bash docs
    // that `&` jobs DO survive — set them up in nohup or another tool if
    // long-running is intended.
    let _ = killpg_guard;
    Ok(if stderr.is_empty() { stdout } else { format!("{stdout}\n[stderr]\n{stderr}") })
 }
 pub async fn handle_edit(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let file_path = args.get("file_path").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "file_path"))?;
    let old_string = args.get("old_string").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "old_string"))?;
    let new_string = args.get("new_string").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_edit", "new_string"))?;
    if old_string.is_empty() {
        return Err("kei_edit: old_string must not be empty".into());
    }
    // v0.46 fix #4: blocking path validation moved off the tokio worker.
    let p_owned = file_path.to_string();
    let safe_path = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || validate_path(&p_owned))
        .await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: thread join: {e}"))??;
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Edit",
        "tool_input": {
            "file_path": safe_path.display().to_string(),
            "old_string": old_string,
            "new_string": new_string
        }
    });
    run_chain("edit", &hook_input).await?;
    open_nofollow_read_write_edit(&safe_path, old_string, new_string).await
 }
 pub async fn handle_write(args: &Value) -> Result<String, String> {
    let file_path = args.get("file_path").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_write", "file_path"))?;
    let content = args.get("content").and_then(Value::as_str)
        .ok_or_else(|| missing_arg("kei_write", "content"))?;
    let p_owned = file_path.to_string();
    let safe_path = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || validate_path(&p_owned))
        .await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: thread join: {e}"))??;
    let hook_input = json!({
        "tool_name": "Write",
        "tool_input": { "file_path": safe_path.display().to_string(), "content": content }
    });
    run_chain("write", &hook_input).await?;
    if let Some(parent) = safe_path.parent() {
        if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
            fs::create_dir_all(parent).await
                .map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", parent.display()))?;
        }
    }
    open_nofollow_write(&safe_path, content).await
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #2: edit via O_NOFOLLOW-opened fd to close the TOCTOU window
 /// between validate_path and the write.
 #[cfg(unix)]
 async fn open_nofollow_read_write_edit(
    path: &Path, old_string: &str, new_string: &str,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
    let path = path.to_path_buf();
    let old_s = old_string.to_string();
    let new_s = new_string.to_string();
    let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<String, String> {
        let mut f = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
            .read(true).write(true)
            .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
            .open(&path)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: open(O_NOFOLLOW) {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        use std::io::{Read, Write, Seek, SeekFrom};
        let mut contents = String::new();
        f.read_to_string(&mut contents)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: read {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        if !contents.contains(&old_s) {
            return Err(format!("kei_edit: old_string not found in {}", path.display()));
        }
        let updated = contents.replacen(&old_s, &new_s, 1);
        f.set_len(0).map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: truncate {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: seek {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        f.write_all(updated.as_bytes())
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        Ok(format!("edited {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), updated.len()))
    }).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_edit: thread join: {e}"))?;
    result
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 async fn open_nofollow_read_write_edit(
    path: &Path, old_string: &str, new_string: &str,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
    let contents = fs::read_to_string(path).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    if !contents.contains(old_string) {
        return Err(format!("kei_edit: old_string not found in {}", path.display()));
    }
    let updated = contents.replacen(old_string, new_string, 1);
    fs::write(path, &updated).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    Ok(format!("edited {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), updated.len()))
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 async fn open_nofollow_write(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
    let path = path.to_path_buf();
    let bytes = content.as_bytes().to_vec();
    let result = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<String, String> {
        let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
        opts.write(true).create(true).truncate(true);
        opts.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW);
        let mut f = opts.open(&path)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: open(O_NOFOLLOW) {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        use std::io::Write;
        f.write_all(&bytes)
            .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
        Ok(format!("wrote {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), bytes.len()))
    }).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("kei_write: thread join: {e}"))?;
    result
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 async fn open_nofollow_write(path: &Path, content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
    fs::write(path, content).await
        .map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
    Ok(format!("wrote {} ({} bytes)", path.display(), content.len()))
 }
 fn missing_arg(tool: &str, field: &str) -> String {
    format!("{tool}: missing '{field}' argument")
 }
 // PathBuf only needed in cfg(unix) blocks via spawn_blocking captures.
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 fn _path_buf_keep() -> Option<PathBuf> { None }
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/mod.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
 //! Phase C — cross-CLI hook enforcement via MCP-wrapped tools.
 //!
 //! v0.46: decomposed from single safe_tools.rs (738 LOC, god-object per
 //! architect audit) into 5 focused modules:
 //!
 //!   mod.rs          — descriptor list + tools/call dispatch (this file)
 //!   chain_runner.rs — load_chain + run_chain (policy enforcement engine)
 //!   path_guard.rs   — validate_path + canonicalize-with-walk-up + allowed_roots
 //!   exec.rs         — handle_bash/edit/write + O_NOFOLLOW open + write paths
 //!   env_guard.rs    — apply_safe_env + set_process_group + KillPgGuard (RAII)
 //!
 //! Exposes three built-in MCP tools — `kei_bash`, `kei_edit`, `kei_write` —
 //! that synthesize Claude Code's PreToolUse hook input contract and chain
 //! through the hook scripts in `~/.claude/hooks/_lib/policy-chain.toml`.
 //!
 //! v0.46 architectural fix #1 (Claude critic CRITICAL): REMOVED env-based
 //! chain-skip (was `CLAUDECODE=1` / `GROKCODE=1` → skip). Rationale: those
 //! envs were set assuming "if we're inside Claude/Grok, native PreToolUse
 //! already fires — skip our chain to avoid double-firing". But native
 //! PreToolUse matchers fire on tool_name = "Bash"|"Edit"|"Write" — these
 //! MCP tools are named `kei_bash`/`kei_edit`/`kei_write` (or with mcp__
 //! prefix). Native hooks therefore NEVER fire on these calls, and the
 //! env-skip created a real auth-bypass hole on Grok. Chain now ALWAYS
 //! runs; the perf concern was fictional.
 use crate::protocol::{err, ok, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, INTERNAL_ERROR};
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 mod chain_runner;
 mod env_guard;
 mod exec;
 mod path_guard;
 /// Per-step timeout (each hook AND the action each get up to this long).
 /// For an N-hook chain the total wall-clock cap is approximately
 /// `(N+1) * SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS`. v0.44 doc-honesty: prior versions
 /// claimed this was an "aggregate" cap which was always wrong.
 pub(crate) const SAFE_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 60;
 /// MCP tool descriptors — appended to `tools/list` by `handlers::tools::list`.
 pub fn descriptors() -> Vec<Value> {
    vec![
        json!({
            "name": "kei_bash",
            "description": "Run a shell command after running KeiSeiKit's [bash] policy chain (no-github-push, safety-guard, destructive-guard). Blocks on hook exit 2 with the hook's stderr surfaced as the MCP error message. Use this instead of native shell on non-Claude CLIs to inherit Claude Code's safety enforcement.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "command": { "type": "string", "description": "Shell command to execute" },
                    "cwd": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional working directory; defaults to $PWD" }
                },
                "required": ["command"]
            }
        }),
        json!({
            "name": "kei_edit",
            "description": "Modify a file (replace old_string with new_string) after running KeiSeiKit's [edit] policy chain (citation-verify, numeric-claims-guard). Blocks unverified academic citations and numeric claims without evidence markers.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "file_path": { "type": "string" },
                    "old_string": { "type": "string" },
                    "new_string": { "type": "string" }
                },
                "required": ["file_path", "old_string", "new_string"]
            }
        }),
        json!({
            "name": "kei_write",
            "description": "Write content to a file after running KeiSeiKit's [write] policy chain (citation-verify, numeric-claims-guard). Blocks unverified academic citations and numeric claims without evidence markers.",
            "inputSchema": {
                "type": "object",
                "properties": {
                    "file_path": { "type": "string" },
                    "content": { "type": "string" }
                },
                "required": ["file_path", "content"]
            }
        }),
    ]
 }
 /// Dispatch entry — called from `handlers::tools::call` when the tool name
 /// matches one of the three `kei_*` built-ins.
 pub async fn dispatch_safe(req: JsonRpcRequest, name: &str, args: &Value) -> JsonRpcResponse {
    let result = match name {
        "kei_bash"  => exec::handle_bash(args).await,
        "kei_edit"  => exec::handle_edit(args).await,
        "kei_write" => exec::handle_write(args).await,
        _ => Err(format!("safe_tools dispatched unknown name: {name}")),
    };
    match result {
        Ok(text) => ok(req.id, json!({
            "content": [{ "type": "text", "text": text }],
            "isError": false,
        })),
        Err(e) => err(req.id, INTERNAL_ERROR, e),
    }
 }
--- a/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/path_guard.rs
+++ b/_primitives/_rust/kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/path_guard.rs
@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
 //! Path-traversal + symlink + denylist guard for `kei_edit` / `kei_write`.
 //!
 //! v0.46: extracted from monolithic safe_tools.rs. Pure-sync helpers — the
 //! async handlers in exec.rs wrap them in `spawn_blocking` so a slow
 //! `canonicalize` syscall doesn't starve a tokio worker (v0.46 fix #4).
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 /// v0.41 (initial): rejected `..`, canonicalized PARENT, checked denylist + roots.
 ///   → 4-CLI re-audit (2026-05-26) found this was bypassable via symlink at the
 ///     leaf and self-attackable via the $HOME blanket-allowed root.
 ///
 /// v0.42 fixes:
 ///   #1 [CRITICAL] reject if the leaf is a symlink for new files; canonicalize
 ///      full path when the file exists.
 ///   #2 [HIGH] $HOME removed from default allowed-roots — default is $PWD only.
 ///      Denylist now also covers $HOME/.claude/ (the substrate itself), shell
 ///      init files, and credential stores.
 ///
 /// v0.44 fixes:
 ///   #1 [CRITICAL] walk_up_to_canonicalize — finds deepest existing ancestor,
 ///      canonicalizes THAT (resolving all symlinks in the existing prefix),
 ///      reattaches the non-existent tail. Closes the "parent's parent is a
 ///      symlink" bypass.
 ///   #5 [HIGH] Path::starts_with for component-aware containment + canonical
 ///      KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS so /var → /private/var symlink works on macOS.
 ///   #6 [MED] allowed_roots check FIRST; narrowed /var/ blanket to /var/db/,
 ///      /var/log/, /var/root/ — macOS $TMPDIR = /var/folders/ now allowed.
 pub fn validate_path(p: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    if p.is_empty() {
        return Err("file_path: empty".into());
    }
    if p.split('/').any(|seg| seg == "..") {
        return Err(format!("file_path: '..' segment not allowed in {p}"));
    }
    let path = Path::new(p);
    let canonical = canonicalize_with_walk_up(path)?;
    // Reject if the leaf is a symlink (covers dangling symlinks for new files).
    if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&canonical) {
        if meta.file_type().is_symlink() {
            return Err(format!(
                "file_path: leaf is a symlink (refusing to follow): {}",
                canonical.display()
            ));
        }
    }
    // Allowed-root containment FIRST (v0.44 fix #6).
    let roots = allowed_roots();
    // v0.46 fix #3: empty allowed_roots → fail-CLOSED (was: silently
    // disabled containment). Operator must explicitly set KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS
    // to "" if they want to disable, and we still reject empty.
    if roots.is_empty() {
        return Err(
            "file_path: allowed_roots is empty — refusing all writes \
             (set KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS to a non-empty value or run from a real cwd)".into()
        );
    }
    let in_allowed_root = roots.iter().any(|r| canonical.starts_with(r));
    if !in_allowed_root {
        return Err(format!(
            "file_path: outside allowed roots {:?}: {}",
            roots, canonical.display()
        ));
    }
    let canon_str = canonical.display().to_string();
    // Reject system + substrate-control + credential paths.
    let denylist = [
        "/etc/", "/usr/", "/System/", "/var/db/", "/var/log/", "/var/root/",
        "/private/etc/", "/private/var/db/", "/private/var/log/", "/private/var/root/",
        "/root/", "/bin/", "/sbin/",
    ];
    for d in denylist {
        if canon_str.starts_with(d) {
            return Err(format!("file_path: denied (system dir): {canon_str}"));
        }
    }
    if let Ok(home) = std::env::var("HOME") {
        let dir_secrets = [
            ".ssh/", ".aws/", ".gnupg/", ".config/gcloud/", ".cargo/credentials",
            ".npmrc", ".docker/config.json", ".kube/",
            ".claude/", ".grok/", ".gemini/", ".copilot/", ".kimi/",
        ];
        for sd in dir_secrets {
            let full = format!("{home}/{sd}");
            if canon_str.starts_with(&full) {
                return Err(format!("file_path: denied (secret/substrate dir): {canon_str}"));
            }
        }
        let init_files = [
            ".zshrc", ".bashrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile", ".zprofile",
            ".zshenv", ".bash_login", ".inputrc", ".gitconfig",
            ".config/fish/config.fish",
        ];
        for f in init_files {
            let full = format!("{home}/{f}");
            if canon_str == full {
                return Err(format!("file_path: denied (shell-init file): {canon_str}"));
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(canonical)
 }
 /// v0.44 fix #1: walk up the path looking for the deepest existing ancestor,
 /// canonicalize THAT, then reattach the non-existent tail components.
 fn canonicalize_with_walk_up(path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
    let abs = if path.is_absolute() {
        path.to_path_buf()
    } else {
        std::env::current_dir()
            .map_err(|e| format!("file_path: cwd unavailable: {e}"))?
            .join(path)
    };
    let mut current = abs.clone();
    let mut tail: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = Vec::new();
    let canon = loop {
        if current.exists() {
            break current.canonicalize()
                .map_err(|e| format!("file_path: canonicalize {}: {e}", current.display()))?;
        }
        let name = current.file_name()
            .ok_or_else(|| format!("file_path: path has no existing ancestor: {}", abs.display()))?
            .to_os_string();
        let parent = match current.parent() {
            Some(p) if !p.as_os_str().is_empty() => p.to_path_buf(),
            _ => return Err(format!("file_path: walked to root without finding existing dir: {}", abs.display())),
        };
        tail.push(name);
        current = parent;
    };
    let mut result = canon;
    for name in tail.into_iter().rev() {
        result.push(name);
    }
    Ok(result)
 }
 pub fn allowed_roots() -> Vec<String> {
    let canon_with_slash = |raw: &str| -> Option<String> {
        let p = Path::new(raw);
        let canon = std::fs::canonicalize(p).unwrap_or_else(|_| p.to_path_buf());
        let mut s = canon.display().to_string();
        if !s.ends_with('/') { s.push('/'); }
        if s.is_empty() { None } else { Some(s) }
    };
    if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS") {
        return v.split(':')
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .filter_map(canon_with_slash)
            .collect();
    }
    let mut roots = Vec::new();
    if let Ok(cwd) = std::env::current_dir() {
        if let Some(r) = canon_with_slash(&cwd.display().to_string()) {
            roots.push(r);
        }
    }
    roots
 }
--- a/bin/kei
+++ b/bin/kei
@ -217,17 +217,30 @@ splash() {
  as="$(active_sessions)"
  # Only color if stdout is a tty. Brand palette: голубой (sky-blue) + жёлтый (gold).
-  local C0= C1= C2= C3= CV=
+  local C0= C1= C2= C3= CV= CS= GO_BACK= SHADOW_BLOCK=
  if [ -t 1 ]; then
    C0=$'\033[0m'
    C1=$'\033[1;38;5;39m'    # голубой (sky-blue) — logo
    C2=$'\033[1;38;5;220m'   # жёлтый (gold) — brand line
    C3=$'\033[2;38;5;39m'    # dim blue — separators
    CV=$'\033[1;38;5;220m'   # жёлтый — field values
    CS=$'\033[1;38;5;130m'   # благородная насыщенная жёлто-бронзовая тень
    # v0.47 drop shadow: print shadow first (offset +2 cols right),
    # then \e[7A returns cursor to start of art, blue letters overwrite
    # shadow where they overlap. Visible shadow = right-edge tail +
    # one full row below blue's bottom (offset +1 row down).
    GO_BACK=$'\033[7A'
    SHADOW_BLOCK="
 ${CS}      ██╗  ██╗███████╗██╗███████╗███████╗██╗${C0}
 ${CS}      ██║ ██╔╝██╔════╝██║██╔════╝██╔════╝██║${C0}
 ${CS}      █████╔╝ █████╗  ██║███████╗█████╗  ██║${C0}
 ${CS}      ██╔═██╗ ██╔══╝  ██║╚════██║██╔══╝  ██║${C0}
 ${CS}      ██║  ██╗███████╗██║███████║███████╗██║${C0}
 ${CS}      ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚══════╝╚═╝╚══════╝╚══════╝╚═╝${C0}${GO_BACK}"
  fi
  cat <<EOF
-
+${SHADOW_BLOCK}
 ${C1}    ██╗  ██╗███████╗██╗███████╗███████╗██╗${C0}
 ${C1}    ██║ ██╔╝██╔════╝██║██╔════╝██╔════╝██║${C0}
 ${C1}    █████╔╝ █████╗  ██║███████╗█████╗  ██║${C0}
@ -235,7 +248,7 @@ ${C1}    ██╔═██╗ ██╔══╝  ██║╚════█
 ${C1}    ██║  ██╗███████╗██║███████║███████╗██║${C0}
 ${C1}    ╚═╝  ╚═╝╚══════╝╚═╝╚══════╝╚══════╝╚═╝${C0}
-${C2}    KeiSeiKit · substrate v0.45${C0}
+${C2}    KeiSeiKit · substrate v0.49${C0}
 ${C3}    ─────────────────────────────────────${C0}
      primary CLI    : ${CV}${PRIMARY}${C0}
      profile        : ${CV}${p}${C0}
--- a/bootstrap.sh
+++ b/bootstrap.sh
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ prompt_profile() {
    # no 105-crate compile, can't half-fail. Matches install.sh's own default
    # (was "cortex" here → divergent install vs direct install.sh). Opt up with
    # --profile=cortex/full-hub.
-    if [ ! -t 0 ]; then PROFILE="minimal"; return 0; fi
+    if ! kei_is_interactive; then PROFILE="minimal"; return 0; fi
    cat <<'WIZARD'
 ╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
@ -115,14 +115,86 @@ log()  { echo "[bootstrap] $*"; }
 err()  { echo "[bootstrap] ERROR: $*" >&2; }
 have() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
 # v0.49: source the interactive-prompt cube (Constructor Pattern: ONE place
 # where all interactivity logic lives). Tries kit-local path first (when
 # running from a clone / curl|bash via cloned checkout), then installed
 # path (when bootstrap re-runs from $HOME/.claude). Last-resort inline
 # fallback if neither found — keeps the script self-bootable.
 _KIT_DIR_PRE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 if [ -r "$_KIT_DIR_PRE/scripts/kei-prompt.sh" ]; then
    # shellcheck source=scripts/kei-prompt.sh
    . "$_KIT_DIR_PRE/scripts/kei-prompt.sh"
 elif [ -r "$HOME/.claude/scripts/kei-prompt.sh" ]; then
    # shellcheck disable=SC1091
    . "$HOME/.claude/scripts/kei-prompt.sh"
 else
    # Self-contained fallback so bootstrap never breaks when run from a
    # weird directory. Mirrors kei_is_interactive's contract only.
    kei_is_interactive() {
        [ "${KEI_NONINTERACTIVE:-0}" = "1" ] && return 1
        if [ -r /dev/tty ] && [ -w /dev/tty ]; then return 0; fi
        [ -t 0 ] && return 0
        return 1
    }
 fi
 unset _KIT_DIR_PRE
 OS="$(uname -s)"
 # --- 1. OS detection -----------------------------------------------------
 # Detect WSL2 (uname -s = Linux but kernel reports Microsoft) — full path works.
 # Detect Git Bash / Cygwin / MSYS on bare Windows — substrate cannot run there;
 # guide user to WSL2 instead of dying silently.
 IS_WSL=0
 if [ "$OS" = "Linux" ] && [ -r /proc/version ] && grep -qiE "microsoft|wsl" /proc/version 2>/dev/null; then
    IS_WSL=1
 fi
 case "$OS" in
-    Darwin|Linux) ;;
+    Darwin|Linux)
-    *) err "unsupported OS: $OS (only Darwin / Linux for now)"; exit 1 ;;
+        if [ "$IS_WSL" = "1" ]; then
            log "OS: WSL2 (Linux inside Windows) — full substrate path available"
        else
            log "OS: $OS"
        fi
        ;;
    MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
        err ""
        err "Detected: bare Windows ($OS) via Git Bash / Cygwin / MSYS."
        err ""
        err "KeiSeiKit's substrate is Bash-only and needs apt/brew + full POSIX —"
        err "it will not run reliably outside WSL2."
        err ""
        err "A native PowerShell port is demand-driven — not built yet because"
        err "WSL2 covers 100% with zero code duplication. If enough Windows users"
        err "ask, we will ship one. Open / 👍 an issue at:"
        err "  https://github.com/KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit-1.0/issues"
        err ""
        err "Path forward (one-time setup, ~5 min + reboot):"
        err ""
        err "  1. Open PowerShell as Administrator."
        err "  2. Run:        wsl --install -d Ubuntu"
        err "  3. Reboot when prompted; Ubuntu auto-starts on next login."
        err "  4. Inside Ubuntu, re-run this same bootstrap:"
        err "       curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit-1.0/main/bootstrap.sh | bash"
        err ""
        err "Alternative — MCP-only (no substrate, no skills, no hooks):"
        err "  Grab kei-mcp-server-windows-x64.exe from a release and wire it"
        err "  into Claude Desktop / VS Code MCP config. Gets you spawn_agent +"
        err "  kei_bash/kei_edit/kei_write only. See README → Platforms section."
        err ""
        # Best-effort: copy the wsl --install command to clipboard if possible.
        if command -v clip.exe >/dev/null 2>&1; then
            printf 'wsl --install -d Ubuntu' | clip.exe 2>/dev/null && \
                err "(I've copied 'wsl --install -d Ubuntu' to your Windows clipboard.)"
        fi
        exit 1
        ;;
    *)
        err "unsupported OS: $OS (supported: Darwin / Linux / WSL2)"
        exit 1
        ;;
 esac
 log "OS: $OS"
 # --- 2. install jq -------------------------------------------------------
 install_jq() {
@ -179,6 +251,19 @@ log "checkout: $KIT_DIR"
 # --- 5. run install ------------------------------------------------------
 log "running install.sh --profile=$PROFILE $YES_FLAG ${EXTRA_FLAGS[*]:-}"
 cd "$KIT_DIR"
 # v0.48: reattach stdin to /dev/tty for the install + everything after.
 # Under `curl|bash` stdin is the curl pipe, so install.sh's interactive
 # gates (5 places: language pick, preflight, hooks-activate, sleep wizard,
 # PATH wiring) all silently skip via [ -t 0 ] being false. Reattaching ONCE
 # here cascades correctly: every child script inherits the terminal stdin
 # and its [ -t 0 ] returns true. Only do it if /dev/tty is actually
 # present and readable (CI / nohup / systemd: skip — those are headless).
 if [ -r /dev/tty ] && [ -w /dev/tty ]; then
    exec </dev/tty
    log "stdin reattached to /dev/tty (curl|bash interactive prompts will work)"
 fi
 # Defensive: invoke via `bash` not `./install.sh` because GitHub's contents
 # API does NOT preserve the executable bit on `gh api -X PUT` updates
 # (only the git Data API does). Older clones may have install.sh with
@ -205,11 +290,12 @@ log "===========================================================================
 log "DONE — KeiSeiKit installed (profile: $PROFILE)"
 log "==========================================================================="
-# v0.45: post-install onboarding wizard.
+# v0.48: post-install onboarding wizard.
-# Auto-triggers if stdin is a TTY (real terminal). Wizard itself re-checks
+# stdin already reattached to /dev/tty above (when present), so [ -t 0 ]
-# and exits cleanly if non-interactive — so curl|bash one-liner runs work too.
+# inside this scope correctly reports interactive vs headless. Wizard
 # itself re-checks and exits cleanly if non-interactive.
 ONBOARD_SH="$HOME/.claude/scripts/kei-onboard.sh"
-if [ -x "$ONBOARD_SH" ] && [ -t 0 ] && [ "${KEI_NO_ONBOARD:-0}" != "1" ]; then
+if [ -x "$ONBOARD_SH" ] && kei_is_interactive && [ "${KEI_NO_ONBOARD:-0}" != "1" ]; then
  log ""
  log "Starting post-install onboarding (pick primary CLI + wire MCP)..."
  log "Skip with KEI_NO_ONBOARD=1; re-run anytime with 'kei onboard'."
@ -230,3 +316,23 @@ log "  - Or source the rc file the installer wrote (Bash: ~/.bashrc, Zsh: ~/.zsh
 log "  - Run kei-doctor for a full health diagnostic."
 log "  - For cortex profile: run /cortex-setup inside Claude Code."
 log "  - For sleep layer: run /sleep-setup inside Claude Code."
 # v0.48: offer to launch `kei` for a first status look.
 # stdin was reattached to /dev/tty above (when present), so [ -t 0 ] is
 # now true under curl|bash too. Simple gate works correctly.
 KEI_BIN_PATH="$HOME/.claude/bin/kei"
 if [ -x "$KEI_BIN_PATH" ] && kei_is_interactive && [ "${KEI_NO_AUTORUN:-0}" != "1" ]; then
    log ""
    printf '  → Запустить kei сейчас? [Y/n] '
    _reply=""
    read -r _reply || _reply=""
    case "${_reply:-Y}" in
        [Nn]*)
            log "  (skipped — run 'kei' anytime to see substrate status)"
            ;;
        *)
            log ""
            "$KEI_BIN_PATH" || true
            ;;
    esac
 fi
--- a/docs/encyclopedia/cross-cli-policy.md
+++ b/docs/encyclopedia/cross-cli-policy.md
@ -116,6 +116,40 @@ The chain runs against the same hook scripts Claude uses; identical input
 shape, identical decisions. On block, the hook's stderr surfaces as the MCP
 error message so the calling agent sees exactly why.
 **v0.44 hardening** (post second 4-CLI re-audit, supersedes v0.42; CURRENT):
 The second-round audit (Claude+Grok+Gemini+Copilot, each from different
 angle) found 9 real issues in v0.42–v0.43. All patched. Highlights:
 - **Walk-up canonicalize** for non-existent leaf paths — closes the v0.42
  bypass where the *parent's parent* could be a symlink. validate_path
  now finds the deepest existing ancestor and canonicalizes from there.
 - **O_NOFOLLOW + fd-write** — closes TOCTOU window between validate_path
  and `fs::write`. Concurrent symlink-swap during hook chain await is now
  rejected at `open()` time.
 - **`env_clear` on subprocess spawn** — `kei_bash` no longer inherits
  `AWS_*`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `MOONSHOT_API_KEY`, etc. Whitelist forwards
  PATH/HOME/USER/LANG/TERM/SHELL/PWD/TMPDIR only. Add named vars via
  `KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA`.
 - **`Path::starts_with` + canonical KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS** —
  `KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/u/proj` no longer matches `/home/u/proj-evil/`.
  Component-aware containment + symlink resolution (so `/var → /private/var`
  on macOS works for `/var/folders` $TMPDIR).
 - **MOONSHOT_API_KEY sanitization** in `kei limits` — token validated
  against `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+` before being fed to `curl --config -`; blocks
  config injection if env value was tampered.
 - **macOS `/var/folders` carve-out** — denylist no longer blocks $TMPDIR.
  allowed_roots check runs BEFORE denylist; only `/var/db/`, `/var/log/`,
  `/var/root/` etc. are now blanket-denied.
 - **Hook subprocess hardening** — `process_group(0)` + `killpg` now also
  applied to hook spawn (was: only on bash action; v0.42 left hook
  grandchildren orphan on timeout).
 **v0.43 hardening** (post first re-audit):
 - 4 audit fixes in `kei-limits.sh` (atomic cache, tonumber? parse,
  off-argv token, jq runtime guard).
 **v0.42 hardening** (post 4-CLI re-audit, supersedes v0.41):
 - **Fail-CLOSED everywhere** — missing config, missing hook, OR empty
--- a/docs/encyclopedia/multi-cli-agents.md
+++ b/docs/encyclopedia/multi-cli-agents.md
@ -108,6 +108,18 @@ strengths; the substrate is agnostic about which you pick. Pick by:
 - **Independent second opinion** — same agent, different model, see if
  conclusions diverge.
 ## First-run wizard (`kei onboard`, v0.45+)
 After install, `bootstrap.sh` auto-triggers `kei onboard` if stdin is a TTY.
 The wizard walks through:
 1. Pick primary LLM orchestrator (claude / grok / agy / copilot / kimi)
 2. Run `kei mcp-wire` to wire kei-mcp into all detected CLIs
 3. Optional MOONSHOT_API_KEY hint for `kei limits` live polling
 4. Run `kei-doctor` health check
 Re-run any time: `kei onboard`. Skip auto-trigger on install: `KEI_NO_ONBOARD=1`.
 ## Orchestrator picker — `kei` no longer hardcodes claude
 Without args, `kei` reads `~/.claude/config/primary.toml` and execs that CLI.
@ -125,6 +137,21 @@ The splash shows `primary CLI: <backend>` so you always know which orchestrator
 will start. If the chosen primary isn't installed, `kei` prints the install
 command and offers `kei pick` as recovery.
 ## Subscription quotas — `kei limits` (v0.43+)
 ```bash
 kei limits             # human-readable report
 kei limits --json      # machine-readable
 kei limits --quiet     # cache-refresh only, no output
 ```
 Research-grounded honest delivery: 4 of 5 CLIs have **no public programmatic
 API for quota**. The command shows status markers + dashboard URLs for those.
 Only Kimi exposes a balance API via Moonshot `/v1/users/me/balance` —
 requires `MOONSHOT_API_KEY` env. The cache lives at
 `~/.claude/pet/limits-cache.json`; the pet statusline reads it (does NOT
 poll itself) and displays the Kimi balance segment when live.
 ## Cross-CLI sub-agent spawn via MCP — `spawn_agent`
 `kei-mcp` exposes a built-in `spawn_agent` MCP tool. Any CLI that connects
--- a/hooks/alignment-check.sh
+++ b/hooks/alignment-check.sh
--- a/hooks/chat-numeric-postflag.sh
+++ b/hooks/chat-numeric-postflag.sh
--- a/hooks/chat-numeric-prewarn.sh
+++ b/hooks/chat-numeric-prewarn.sh
--- a/hooks/citation-verify.sh
+++ b/hooks/citation-verify.sh
--- a/hooks/no-downgrade.sh
+++ b/hooks/no-downgrade.sh
--- a/hooks/no-python-without-approval.sh
+++ b/hooks/no-python-without-approval.sh
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 _KEI_LIB="$(dirname "$0")/_lib/gate.sh"; if [ -r "$_KEI_LIB" ]; then . "$_KEI_LIB"; kei_hook_gate "no-python-without-approval" || exit 0; fi
 # Hard block on python/python3/python2 invocations in Bash tool.
 # RULE 0.2 (Rust First) — Python requires explicit architectural reason.
-# Claude кroнически нарушает RULE 0.2 inline-вызовами python3 для мелких расчётов.
+# Claude kрoнически нарушает RULE 0.2 inline-вызовами python3 для мелких расчётов.
 # Этот хук форсирует: каждый python-вызов = отдельный approval через интерфейс.
 #
 # How to approve: user may add a one-off permission via Claude Code's
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ fi
 # Also: uv run python, poetry run python, pipx run python
 if echo "$CMD" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:]/"=(|&;`])(python|python2|python3)([0-9]?\.[0-9]+)?([[:space:]]|$)'; then
  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  BLOCKED — Python invocation requires explicit approval (RULE 0.2).
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 RULE 0.2 Rust First:
  Python не разрешается по умолчанию. Для "одноразовых расчётов"
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ that only exists in Python, one of the RULE 0.2 exceptions 1-7):
 This hook installed 2026-04-21 by user request after repeated
 repeated inline python3 use where Rust would suffice.
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 EOF
  exit 2
 fi
--- a/hooks/numeric-claims-guard.sh
+++ b/hooks/numeric-claims-guard.sh
@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ fi
 # Patterns that indicate a numeric claim
 # - "~N min/hour/day/week"
 # - "N MB/GB/LOC/tests/crates/atomars"
-# - "~$N", "$N/mo"
+# - "~$N", "$N/mo", "$N.NN", "$NN" (money needs decimal / unit / tilde / 2+ digits
 #   so shell positionals $1..$9 are NOT flagged)
 # - "Nm Ns", "займёт N", "should take N"
 NUMERIC_PATTERN='(~\s*[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?\s*(min|minute|hour|hr|day|week|month|sec|second|MB|GB|KB|LOC|line|test|crate|atomar|%|µs|ms|ns|TPS|req/s)|[0-9]+m\s*[0-9]+s|\$[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|\$[0-9]+/(mo|hr|day|run)|\$[0-9]{2,}|~\s*\$[0-9]+|should take|will take|takes about|займёт|за ~|estimated at|ETA[: ]|approximately\s+[0-9])'
@ -48,9 +49,9 @@ fi
 MATCHED="$(echo "$NEW_CONTENT" | grep -iEo "$NUMERIC_PATTERN" | head -3 | tr '\n' '; ')"
 cat >&2 <<EOF
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  RULE 0.18 — Numeric claim without evidence marker.
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 Found in Edit/Write content:
  $MATCHED
@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ Bypass (visible, per-call):
  RULE_017_BYPASS=1 <command>
 See: ~/.claude/rules/numeric-claims-evidence.md
-═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 EOF
 exit 2
--- a/hooks/rust-first.sh
+++ b/hooks/rust-first.sh
--- a/install.sh
+++ b/install.sh
@ -20,6 +20,28 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 # --- OS guard (v0.47): friendly message on bare Windows ------------------
 _uname_s="$(uname -s 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
 case "$_uname_s" in
    Darwin|Linux) ;;  # ok
    MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
        echo "[install.sh] ERROR: bare Windows ($_uname_s) detected." >&2
        echo "" >&2
        echo "KeiSeiKit's substrate is Bash-only. Use WSL2 instead:" >&2
        echo "  1. PowerShell (admin):  wsl --install -d Ubuntu" >&2
        echo "  2. Reboot when prompted; launch Ubuntu." >&2
        echo "  3. Inside Ubuntu, re-run this installer." >&2
        echo "" >&2
        echo "See README → 'Platforms' for the full path + MCP-only fallback." >&2
        exit 1
        ;;
    *)
        echo "[install.sh] ERROR: unsupported OS: $_uname_s (supported: Darwin / Linux / WSL2)" >&2
        exit 1
        ;;
 esac
 unset _uname_s
 # --- paths ----------------------------------------------------------------
 KIT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 HOME_DIR="${HOME:?HOME not set}"
@ -30,6 +52,27 @@ MANIFEST="$KIT_DIR/_primitives/MANIFEST.toml"
 INSTALLED_FILE="$AGENTS_DIR/_primitives/.installed"
 LIB_DIR="$KIT_DIR/install"
 # --- v0.49: interactive-prompt cube (Constructor Pattern SSoT) -----------
 # ALL interactive logic — `kei_is_interactive`, `kei_prompt`, `kei_prompt_yn`,
 # `kei_prompt_secret` — lives in scripts/kei-prompt.sh. NEVER inline
 # `[ -t 0 ]` or `read -r` in installer code. Source it BEFORE other libs
 # so they can use the helpers.
 if [ -r "$KIT_DIR/scripts/kei-prompt.sh" ]; then
    # shellcheck source=scripts/kei-prompt.sh
    source "$KIT_DIR/scripts/kei-prompt.sh"
 elif [ -r "$HOME/.claude/scripts/kei-prompt.sh" ]; then
    # shellcheck disable=SC1091
    source "$HOME/.claude/scripts/kei-prompt.sh"
 else
    # Self-contained fallback — same contract as the cube's kei_is_interactive.
    kei_is_interactive() {
        [ "${KEI_NONINTERACTIVE:-0}" = "1" ] && return 1
        if [ -r /dev/tty ] && [ -w /dev/tty ]; then return 0; fi
        [ -t 0 ] && return 0
        return 1
    }
 fi
 # --- source cubes (order matters: logs -> backup -> profile -> rest) ------
 # shellcheck source=install/lib-log.sh
 source "$LIB_DIR/lib-log.sh"
@ -245,7 +288,7 @@ if [ "$NO_PATHWAY" != "1" ]; then
  # logfile, so -t 1 is false even interactively. Requiring it skipped PATH
  # wiring (~/.claude/bin), so the `kei` entry-point was not found after a
  # curl|bash install. (Same tee/-t1 trap as the onboarding gates.)
-  if [ "$WITH_PATHWAY" = "1" ] || [ -t 0 ]; then
+  if [ "$WITH_PATHWAY" = "1" ] || kei_is_interactive; then
    pathway_install
  fi
 fi
--- a/install/lib-dev-hub-forgejo-runner.sh
+++ b/install/lib-dev-hub-forgejo-runner.sh
--- a/install/lib-dev-hub-forgejo.sh
+++ b/install/lib-dev-hub-forgejo.sh
--- a/install/lib-dev-hub-zoekt.sh
+++ b/install/lib-dev-hub-zoekt.sh
--- a/install/lib-hooks.sh
+++ b/install/lib-hooks.sh
@ -179,17 +179,17 @@ maybe_activate_hooks() {
  elif [ ! -f "$settings_file" ]; then
    say "no existing settings.json; installing snippet"
    activate_hooks && DID_ACTIVATE=1
-  elif [ -t 0 ]; then  # stdin-only: stdout may be tee'd in curl|bash
+  elif kei_is_interactive; then  # /dev/tty-aware: covers curl|bash
    local _hooks_q
    if [ "$COLOR" = "1" ]; then
-      printf '\033[1;36m[install]\033[0m activate hooks now? [y/N] '
+      _hooks_q=$'\033[1;36m[install]\033[0m activate hooks now?'
    else
-      printf '[install] activate hooks now? [y/N] '
+      _hooks_q='[install] activate hooks now?'
    fi
    if kei_prompt_yn "$_hooks_q" "N"; then
      activate_hooks && DID_ACTIVATE=1
    else
      say "skipping hook activation"
    fi
    local reply
    read -r reply
    case "$reply" in
      y|Y|yes|YES) activate_hooks && DID_ACTIVATE=1 ;;
      *) say "skipping hook activation" ;;
    esac
  fi
 }
--- a/install/lib-menu.sh
+++ b/install/lib-menu.sh
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ menu_should_skip() {
  [ -n "$ADD_LIST" ]     && return 0
  [ -n "$REMOVE_NAME" ]  && return 0
  [ "$LIST_MODE" = "1" ] && return 0
-  [ ! -t 0 ]             && return 0   # interactive stdin only; not -t 1 (curl|bash tees stdout)
+  kei_is_interactive || return 0       # /dev/tty-aware: covers curl|bash + plain bash
  return 1
 }
--- a/install/lib-onboarding.sh
+++ b/install/lib-onboarding.sh
@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ REGISTRY_MODELS="$KIT_DIR/_blocks/registries/models.toml"
 onboarding_should_run() {
  [ -f "$ONBOARDED_FLAG" ]    && return 1
  [ "${KEISEI_SKIP_ONBOARD:-}" = "1" ] && return 1
-  # Interactive iff stdin is a terminal. We deliberately do NOT require -t 1:
+  # v0.49: delegate to the kei-prompt cube — covers both plain bash AND
-  # the curl|bash bootstrapper (web-install.sh) tees stdout to a logfile, so
+  # curl|bash (where stdin is the pipe from curl, so [ -t 0 ] is false
-  # -t 1 is false even in an interactive session. Prompts go to stderr, input
+  # even with the user at a real terminal — only /dev/tty is reliable).
-  # reads from stdin — an interactive stdin is the only real requirement.
+  kei_is_interactive || return 1
  [ ! -t 0 ] && return 1
  return 0
 }
@ -72,8 +71,8 @@ onboarding_run() {
    if ! preflight_run "$ONBOARDING_PROVIDER"; then
      echo "" >&2
      echo "  ⚠ ${STR_PREFLIGHT_FAILED:-Preflight failed — provider may not work.}" >&2
-      if [ -t 0 ]; then  # stdin-only: stdout may be tee'd in curl|bash
+      if kei_is_interactive; then  # /dev/tty-aware: covers curl|bash
-        read -r -p "  ${STR_PREFLIGHT_CONTINUE:-Continue anyway? [y/N]} " _ans
+        _ans=$(kei_prompt "  ${STR_PREFLIGHT_CONTINUE:-Continue anyway? [y/N]} " "N")
        case "$_ans" in
          y|Y|yes|да|Да)
            echo "  → продолжаю; ключи запишутся но runtime может упасть." >&2
--- a/install/lib-plan.sh
+++ b/install/lib-plan.sh
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ show_confirm_screen() {
  local profile_label="$1"
  print_plan_body "$profile_label"
  [ "$ASSUME_YES" = "1" ] && { echo "(--yes: auto-confirming)"; return 0; }
-  [ ! -t 0 ] && { echo "(non-TTY: auto-confirming)"; return 0; }
+  kei_is_interactive || { echo "(non-TTY: auto-confirming)"; return 0; }
  if command -v whiptail >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    whiptail --yesno "Install ${CONFIRM_TOTAL:-0} primitive(s) for profile '$profile_label'?\n\nTime: ~${CONFIRM_SECS}s, disk: ~${CONFIRM_MB} MB" 14 70
    return $?
--- a/install/lib-preflight.sh
+++ b/install/lib-preflight.sh
@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ preflight_offer_install() {
  echo "  ⚠ $cli не найден." >&2
  echo "  Установить: $install_cmd" >&2
  echo "" >&2
-  if [ -t 0 ]; then  # stdin-only: stdout may be tee'd in curl|bash
+  if kei_is_interactive; then  # /dev/tty-aware: covers curl|bash
    echo "  ⓘ команда: $install_cmd" >&2
-    read -r -p "  Поставить сейчас? [y/N/skip] " ans
+    ans=$(kei_prompt "  Поставить сейчас? [y/N/skip] " "N")
    case "$ans" in
      y|Y|yes)
        # bash -c вместо eval — explicit subshell, не word-splitting'тся
--- a/install/lib-wizard.sh
+++ b/install/lib-wizard.sh
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 run_sleep_wizard() {
  local sleep_helper="$AGENTS_DIR/_primitives/kei-sleep-setup.sh"
-  if [[ -x "$sleep_helper" ]] && [ -t 0 ]; then  # stdin only; not -t 1 (curl|bash tees stdout)
+  if [[ -x "$sleep_helper" ]] && kei_is_interactive; then  # /dev/tty-aware: covers curl|bash
    say "running sleep-sync setup helper"
    "$sleep_helper" || warn "sleep-sync setup did not complete — re-run via /sleep-setup"
  else
--- a/plugin.json
+++ b/plugin.json
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  "name": "keisei",
  "displayName": "KeiSei",
  "description": "Constructor Pattern multi-LLM agent substrate — 38 agents, 69 skills, 54 hooks, 86 blocks. Cross-CLI policy enforcement (Claude/Grok/Copilot/Agy/Kimi) via kei-mcp + kei_bash/kei_edit/kei_write. Rust primitives via classic ./install.sh.",
-  "version": "0.45.0",
+  "version": "0.49.0",
  "homepage": "https://keisei.app",
  "repository": "https://github.com/KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit-1.0.git",
  "author": {
--- a/scripts/kei-agent-cli.sh
+++ b/scripts/kei-agent-cli.sh
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ backend_invoke() {
      printf '[kei-agent-cli] (or pipe via `kimi acp` if you have an ACP client.)\n' >&2
      exec "$bin"
      ;;
-    codex)                exec "$bin" -p "$prompt" ;;
+    codex)                exec "$bin" exec "$prompt" ;;
  esac
 }
--- a/scripts/kei-configure.sh
+++ b/scripts/kei-configure.sh
--- a/scripts/kei-mcp-wire-claude.sh
+++ b/scripts/kei-mcp-wire-claude.sh
@ -31,12 +31,15 @@ if [ "${KEI_WIRE_CHECK:-0}" = "1" ] || [ "${KEI_WIRE_DRY_RUN:-0}" = "1" ]; then
    "mcpServers": {
      "kei-mcp": {
        "command": "$BIN",
-        "env": { "CLAUDECODE": "1" }
+        "env": {}
      }
    }
  }
-  (CLAUDECODE=1 tells kei-mcp to skip its hook chain — your native hooks
+  (v0.46: CLAUDECODE/GROKCODE env-skip was removed — the chain runs
-   already fire on PreToolUse. Avoids double-enforcement.)
+   always now. Native PreToolUse hooks fire on tool_name='Bash'/'Edit'/
   'Write', but MCP tools are named kei_bash/kei_edit/kei_write, so
   native hooks would NOT fire anyway — there is no double-enforcement
   to avoid. Empty env block left in case operators add their own vars.)
 EOF
 fi
--- a/scripts/kei-mcp-wire-grok.sh
+++ b/scripts/kei-mcp-wire-grok.sh
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ if [ -n "$KEI_MCP_BIN" ] && [ -x "$KEI_MCP_BIN" ]; then
  "mcpServers": {
    "kei-mcp": {
      "command": "$KEI_MCP_BIN",
-      "env": { "GROKCODE": "1" }
+      "env": {}
    }
  }
 }
@ -73,5 +73,5 @@ mv "$tmp" "$CFG"
 echo "  grok: wired PreToolUse hooks → $CFG"
 echo "         5 hook entries (Bash×3 + Edit×2 + Write×2)"
-[ -n "$mcp_block" ] && echo "         kei-mcp MCP server registered (with GROKCODE=1 guard)"
+[ -n "$mcp_block" ] && echo "         kei-mcp MCP server registered (v0.46: chain always runs, no env-skip)"
 echo "         Same enforcement as Claude Code."
--- a/scripts/kei-prompt.sh
+++ b/scripts/kei-prompt.sh
@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 # kei-prompt — единственный cube для интерактивного ввода (Constructor Pattern).
 #
 # Source it, then use the functions. NEVER inline `[ -t 0 ]` + `read` in
 # installer / bootstrap shell files — call these helpers instead.
 #
 # Why this exists (2026-05-27 architectural fix):
 #   - `[ -t 1 ]` fails under curl|bash (stdout tee'd) → rule v1.
 #   - `[ -t 0 ]` ALSO fails under curl|bash (stdin = pipe from curl) → rule v2.
 #   - The ONLY reliable interactive signal is /dev/tty accessibility.
 #   - Spreading that check across 15+ files invites the same bug forever.
 #   - One cube, one truth: kei_is_interactive(). All callers are downstream.
 #
 # Public API (alphabetical):
 #   kei_is_interactive          → 0 if user is at a terminal, 1 if headless
 #   kei_prompt    Q [DEFAULT]   → echo answer (or DEFAULT) to stdout
 #   kei_prompt_yn Q [Y|N]       → exit 0 if user said yes, 1 otherwise
 #   kei_prompt_secret Q         → echo answer (no echo on terminal) to stdout
 #
 # Overrides:
 #   KEI_NONINTERACTIVE=1        → all helpers behave as if headless (CI override)
 # Re-source guard — sourcing twice should be a no-op.
 [ "${_KEI_PROMPT_SOURCED:-0}" = "1" ] && return 0
 _KEI_PROMPT_SOURCED=1
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # kei_is_interactive
 #
 # Returns 0 (interactive) when ANY of:
 #   - /dev/tty is readable AND writable (covers curl|bash, where stdin is
 #     a pipe from curl but the terminal is still attached at fd /dev/tty)
 #   - stdin is a tty (covers plain `./bootstrap.sh` invocation)
 # Returns 1 (headless) when:
 #   - KEI_NONINTERACTIVE=1 (explicit CI override)
 #   - none of the above signals are present
 #
 # Use this EVERYWHERE instead of `[ -t 0 ]` or `[ -t 1 ]`.
 kei_is_interactive() {
    [ "${KEI_NONINTERACTIVE:-0}" = "1" ] && return 1
    if [ -r /dev/tty ] && [ -w /dev/tty ]; then
        return 0
    fi
    if [ -t 0 ]; then
        return 0
    fi
    return 1
 }
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # _kei_read_from_tty — internal: read one line from /dev/tty if openable,
 # else from stdin. Echoes the line via the variable name passed in $1.
 #
 # Note: we try to OPEN /dev/tty (not just `[ -r /dev/tty ]`) — in some
 # sandboxes the file exists but open() returns ENXIO ("Device not
 # configured"). Both stages must be silent on failure so the prompt
 # UI stays clean.
 _kei_read_from_tty() {
    local _varname="$1"
    local _line=""
    if { exec 3</dev/tty; } 2>/dev/null; then
        IFS= read -r _line <&3 || _line=""
        exec 3<&-
    else
        IFS= read -r _line || _line=""
    fi
    # POSIX-safe assignment to caller's variable.
    eval "$_varname=\$_line"
 }
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # kei_prompt <question> [default]
 #
 # Prints `question` to stderr (so it shows even when stdout is captured).
 # Reads user input from /dev/tty (with stdin fallback).
 # Echoes the answer to stdout — or `default` if user pressed Enter / headless.
 # Always returns 0 (never fails the caller).
 kei_prompt() {
    local q="${1:-}"
    local def="${2:-}"
    local ans=""
    if ! kei_is_interactive; then
        printf '%s' "$def"
        return 0
    fi
    printf '%s' "$q" >&2
    _kei_read_from_tty ans
    printf '%s' "${ans:-$def}"
    return 0
 }
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # kei_prompt_yn <question> [default=Y|N]
 #
 # Yes/no convenience. Returns:
 #   0 — user said yes (or default was Y and they pressed Enter / headless)
 #   1 — user said no  (or default was N and they pressed Enter / headless)
 # The hint `[Y/n]` / `[y/N]` is appended automatically based on `default`.
 kei_prompt_yn() {
    local q="${1:-}"
    local def="${2:-Y}"
    local hint=""
    case "$def" in
        [Yy]*) hint="[Y/n]"; def="Y" ;;
        [Nn]*) hint="[y/N]"; def="N" ;;
        *)     hint="[y/n]"; def="N" ;;
    esac
    local ans
    ans="$(kei_prompt "$q $hint " "$def")"
    case "${ans:-$def}" in
        [Yy]*) return 0 ;;
        *)     return 1 ;;
    esac
 }
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # kei_prompt_secret <question>
 #
 # Like kei_prompt but with echo disabled on the terminal (for tokens, keys).
 # Returns 1 if no terminal — secret input should not be silently defaulted.
 # Echoes the secret to stdout; caller is responsible for not logging it.
 kei_prompt_secret() {
    local q="${1:-}"
    local ans=""
    if ! kei_is_interactive; then
        return 1
    fi
    printf '%s' "$q" >&2
    # Prefer /dev/tty so the secret never touches stdin pipe.
    local _src=/dev/stdin
    [ -r /dev/tty ] && _src=/dev/tty
    # `read -s` is bash-only; use stty -echo for POSIX portability.
    if command -v stty >/dev/null 2>&1; then
        local _state
        _state="$(stty -g <"$_src" 2>/dev/null || echo)"
        stty -echo <"$_src" 2>/dev/null || true
        IFS= read -r ans <"$_src" || ans=""
        [ -n "$_state" ] && stty "$_state" <"$_src" 2>/dev/null || stty echo <"$_src" 2>/dev/null
        printf '\n' >&2
    else
        IFS= read -r ans <"$_src" || ans=""
    fi
    printf '%s' "$ans"
    return 0
 }
--- a/scripts/keisei-pet-update.sh
+++ b/scripts/keisei-pet-update.sh
--- a/scripts/keisei-pet.sh
+++ b/scripts/keisei-pet.sh
--- a/web-install.sh
+++ b/web-install.sh
@ -48,13 +48,13 @@ exec > >(tee -a "$LOG") 2>&1
 say() { printf "\033[1;36m[web-install]\033[0m %s\n" "$*"; }
 die() { printf "\033[1;31m[err]\033[0m %s\n" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-# ── splash ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# ── splash ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 cat <<'EOF'
-  ╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+  ╔═════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
  ║           KeiSeiKit · Exobrain installer              ║
  ║   Portable Rust agent substrate for AI coding tools   ║
-  ╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
+  ╚═════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
 EOF
 say "log: $LOG"
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ say "log: $LOG"
 # ── prereq: git (the only thing bootstrap.sh can't self-install) ───────────
 command -v git >/dev/null || die "missing: git  (brew install git / apt install git)"
-# ── auth probe for private repo ────────────────────────────────────────────
+# ── auth probe for private repo ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 case "$KEISEI_REPO" in
  git@github.com:*)
    say "checking GitHub SSH auth"
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ case "$KEISEI_REPO" in
    ;;
 esac
-# ── clone or pull (idempotent) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# ── clone or pull (idempotent) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 mkdir -p "$(dirname "$KEISEI_ROOT")"
 if [ -d "$KEISEI_ROOT/.git" ]; then
  say "pulling $KEISEI_REF in $KEISEI_ROOT"
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ else
 fi
 git -C "$KEISEI_ROOT" submodule update --init --recursive 2>/dev/null || true
-# ── delegate to kit's own bootstrap.sh ─────────────────────────────────────
+# ── delegate to kit's own bootstrap.sh ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 [ -x "$KEISEI_ROOT/bootstrap.sh" ] || die "kit's bootstrap.sh not found in $KEISEI_ROOT"
 say "delegating to $KEISEI_ROOT/bootstrap.sh ${PASS_THROUGH[*]:-}"
 cd "$KEISEI_ROOT"