5 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
KeiSei84	3b54f0b5e0	feat(v0.44): pre-release audit — 1 CRITICAL + 4 HIGH + 4 MEDIUM patched ... Four-CLI parallel pre-release audit (Claude+Grok+Gemini+Copilot, each reviewing different angle) surfaced 9 real issues in v0.43. All fixed. ## Audit team & their finds - Claude (critic): code review — found #5 KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS bypass, #6 macOS TMPDIR denylist conflict, #7 timeout doc drift, #9 failure-cache schema mismatch. - Gemini (security): wrote Rust PoC, verified — found #1 CRITICAL parent symlink for non-existent leaf, #2 TOCTOU await, #3 curl config injection, #4 env inheritance, #8 cwd. - Grok (architect): noted safe_tools.rs at 572 LOC (>200 Constructor threshold). Deferred decomposition to v0.45. - Copilot (docs): inspected README/encyclopedia, no blocker findings (1 Premium, 977k cached tokens). ## Fixes shipped [#1 CRITICAL] Parent-symlink bypass for non-existent leaf paths v0.42 only canonicalized PARENT. If THAT parent didn't exist either, the path fell through to "absolute as-is" with no canonicalization. E.g. /proj/symlink -> /Users/denis, then kei_write /proj/symlink/ newdir/file would write inside /Users/denis with no check. Fix: walk_up_to_canonicalize() — find DEEPEST existing ancestor, canonicalize THAT (resolving all symlinks in the existing prefix), then reattach the non-existent tail. [#2 HIGH] TOCTOU between validate_path and fs::write 60s of hook chain await between path check and write. Concurrent process could swap leaf for symlink during that window; fs::write followed it. Fix: open file with O_NOFOLLOW + write through the open fd (not the path again). Open() itself fails on symlink-swap. Edit + Write both patched. Falls back to plain tokio::fs on non-Unix. [#3 HIGH] curl config injection via MOONSHOT_API_KEY Was: token interpolated into printf 'header = "...%s..."' fed to curl --config. If token contained " + newline + 'url = "evil"', curl parsed the injected config and redirected. Fix: validate MOONSHOT_API_KEY matches [A-Za-z0-9_.-]+; reject any other chars before probe runs. [#4 HIGH] Subprocess env inheritance — secret leak via kei_bash Was: spawned bash inherited AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, MOONSHOT_API_KEY, etc. Agent running `env` via kei_bash could exfiltrate all of them. Fix: apply_safe_env() — env_clear() + whitelist forward of PATH/ HOME/USER/LANG/TERM/SHELL/PWD/TMPDIR/LOGNAME/LC_*. Operators add named vars via KEI_SAFE_ENV_EXTRA. Applied to BOTH kei_bash spawn AND hook subprocess spawn. [#5 HIGH] KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS unanchored prefix bypass Was: str::starts_with on raw user-supplied root. KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/u/proj also allowed /home/u/proj-secrets/... Fix: normalize each entry to canonical + trailing slash; use Path::starts_with (component-aware). v0.44 combines with #6 fix (canonicalize symlinks like /var → /private/var on macOS). [#6 MEDIUM] macOS $TMPDIR denied by /var/ blanket Was: denylist included /var/, /private/var/ blanket entries. macOS $TMPDIR = /var/folders/... canonicalized to /private/var/ folders/... hit the denylist before allowed_roots was checked. Fix: (a) allowed_roots check FIRST; (b) narrowed denylist to /var/db/, /var/log/, /var/root/ (and /private/ counterparts) instead of blanket /var/. /var/folders + /private/tmp are now legitimate working dirs. [#7 MEDIUM] Timeout aggregate claim was always false Was: doc said "Hard cap on single chain + action ... 60s" — actually was per-step. For 3-hook chain, total = 4 * 60 = 240s. Fix: doc comment now honest about per-step semantics. Aggregate- deadline impl deferred to v0.45 (not security-blocking). [#8 MEDIUM] cwd not in hook input — hook approves wrong cwd Was: kei_bash accepts cwd arg but did not pass it to safety hooks. Hook could approve `rm -rf *` assuming PWD, while cwd actually pointed at /etc or ~/.ssh. Fix: include cwd in hook_input JSON. Hooks now see the real working dir for their decision. [#9 MEDIUM] Failure-fallback cache had different schema Was: emit '{"ts":"","status":"assembly-failed"}' — no per-CLI keys. Pet's .kimi.available_balance_usd read got null/error; kei-limits own per-CLI render loop emitted 5 malformed rows. Fix: failure-fallback emits same shape as success {ts, claude, grok, agy, copilot, kimi} with each marked status='assembly-failed'. LOW: empty old_string in kei_edit now rejected (was: silently prepended new_string since contents.contains("") is always true). ## Tests + smokes cargo test -p kei-mcp: 3/3 pass. 8 MCP smokes (all green after every audit round): - kei_bash blocks RULE 0.1 push - kei_bash passes echo OK - kei_write /etc/passwd → denied (system dir) - kei_write ../ → denied (.. segment) - kei_write ~/.ssh/ → denied (outside roots) - kei_write symlink-to-etc/passwd → denied (canonicalized) - kei_write ~/.claude/hooks/ → denied (substrate dir) - kei_write ~/.zshrc → denied (outside roots) NEW v0.44 smokes: - kei_write /Users/denis/.ssh/newdir/keys via /tmp/v44_link → denied - KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/tmp/proj does NOT match /tmp/proj-evil - FAKE_SECRET=stolen → TOKEN=empty in subprocess (env stripped) - MOONSHOT_API_KEY='abc"NL_url="evil"' → rejected pre-probe - macOS $TMPDIR via KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS works (canonicalize fix) ## Deferred to v0.45 - safe_tools.rs at 572 LOC — extract path_guard + chain_runner modules - Aggregate-deadline timeout (single Instant::now() + remaining) - Hardlink check (open fd then fstat + dev/ino compare) - INVALID_PARAMS used for missing-arg (currently INTERNAL_ERROR) - INVALID_PARAMS_REF dead code at EOF (silencer for unused import) These are correctness/style/architectural, NOT security blockers.	2026-05-26 23:00:34 +08:00
KeiSei84	65d17007c3	feat(v0.42): 6 fixes from 4-CLI re-audit (CRITICAL + 2 HIGH + 3 MED) ... Convergent dogfood audit by Claude+Grok+Gemini+Copilot on v0.41 surfaced that the v0.41 'fixes' were incomplete. 3 of 4 reviewers independently found the same CRITICAL bypass; Gemini wrote a Rust test suite to verify. ## Convergent findings → v0.42 fixes [#1 CRITICAL] Symlink leaf bypass (3-of-4 convergent) v0.41 only canonicalized PARENT, then re-attached leaf as-is. Exploit: 1. kei_bash 'ln -s ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ./cfg.txt' (passes the bash hook chain — ln itself is non-destructive) 2. kei_write file_path=cfg.txt content=<key> validate_path saw $PWD/cfg.txt (allowed) → fs::write followed leaf symlink → overwrote authorized_keys. Fix: canonicalize FULL path (incl. leaf) when file exists; for new files, symlink_metadata on leaf and reject is_symlink. Now the denylist check sees the real target. [#2 HIGH] $HOME blanket-allowed = self-neutering (2-of-4 convergent) allowed_roots() defaulted to [$PWD, $HOME], denylist only had 4 secret dirs. So kei_write $HOME/.claude/hooks/no-github-push.sh content='exit 0' was ALLOWED — agent could overwrite the substrate's own policy hooks. Similar attacks on ~/.zshrc (RCE on next shell), ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc. Fix: default to $PWD only. Denylist extended with .claude/, .grok/, .gemini/, .copilot/, .kimi/, all major shell-init files, and additional credential paths. KEI_ALLOWED_ROOTS for explicit widening. [#3 HIGH] Empty-section fail-OPEN (Gemini test-verified) v0.41 'fail-closed on missing config' fix was incomplete: if config file existed but section [bash]/[edit]/[write] was empty, load_chain returned Ok(vec![]) → run_chain early-returned Ok → action ran ungated. Fix: empty chain also FAIL-CLOSED with same KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL opt-in. [#4 MEDIUM] load_chain still blocked tokio worker (Claude) v0.41 fix #4 converted handle_edit/handle_write reads to tokio::fs but left load_chain on std::fs. Slow/hung mount on policy-chain.toml would freeze a worker for every safe_* invocation. Fix: load_chain → async + tokio::fs::{try_exists, read_to_string}. [#5 MEDIUM] process_group only applied to bash, not hooks (Claude) v0.41 fix #5 set_process_group on kei_bash's child shell, but the hook subprocess (spawned per-hook in run_chain) was NOT in its own group. On hook timeout, kill_on_drop killed only the immediate hook process; grandchildren orphaned — the exact failure mode fix #5 was meant to prevent. Fix: set_process_group + killpg also on hook spawn in run_chain. [#6 MEDIUM] Per-step vs aggregate timeout (Claude) Doc claimed 'Hard cap on single chain + action — 60s'. Actual: each hook gets independent 60s, then action gets another 60s. For a 3-hook bash chain that's 240s max — 4× documented. Status: documented as known-limit; single-deadline impl deferred to v0.43 (not security-blocking, just a doc/correctness drift). ## Verification (8 smokes — all green) /etc/passwd → denied (system dir) ✓ ../escape.txt → denied (../ segment) ✓ /tmp/symlink → /etc/passwd writeable → denied (resolved /private/etc) ✓ NEW ~/.claude/hooks/no-github-push.sh → denied (substrate dir) ✓ NEW ~/.zshrc → denied (shell-init file) ✓ NEW policy-chain.toml empty [bash] → FAIL-CLOSED ✓ NEW KEI_POLICY_CHAIN_OPTIONAL=1 → opt-in pass-through ✓ kei_bash git-push-github → BLOCKED (regression) ✓ kei_bash echo HELLO → returns content (regression) ✓ cargo test -p kei-mcp: 3/3 still pass. ## Architecture note from Grok Grok architect flagged: safe_tools.rs is 474 LOC, exceeds Constructor Pattern 200-line threshold. v0.42 does NOT refactor (security fixes shipped first); v0.43 will extract path_guard.rs + chain_runner.rs. ## Per-CLI audit value demonstrated Claude — 5 issues + 5 minor, exhaustive line-anchored analysis Grok — architectural review with grep-verified citations Gemini — wrote Rust test project to verify findings (PoC code!) Copilot — partial fact-check, ran out of mid-task	2026-05-26 21:33:54 +08:00
KeiSei84	596e0b20a1	chore(release): bump v0.40.0 — Phase C cross-CLI hook enforcement ... plugin.json: 0.38.0 → 0.40.0; description updated with real counts (38 agents / 69 skills / 54 hooks / 86 blocks) and cross-CLI policy enforcement summary. bin/kei splash: v0.39 → v0.40 (Phase C ship).	2026-05-26 18:07:18 +08:00
KeiSei84	518d95df80	chore(public-prep): repoint public install + marketplace off private keigit ... Public installs/clones must not hit the author's private Forgejo (keigit.com, direct Vultr, no Cloudflare, fail2ban) — that server times out under load and is the root of the 443 connect failures. - web-install.sh: default KEISEI_REPO keigit -> github.com/KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit-1.0 - plugin.json: homepage -> https://keisei.app; repository -> github - .gitmodules: kei-registries submodule -> github.com/KeiSeiLab/kei-registries (so a public --recursive clone resolves; repo still private until launch) - README.md: manual `git clone` line -> github Left intentionally on keigit: the @keisei/mcp-server npm registry (docs state it's an author-operated mirror, not a community service). Repos stay PRIVATE on github until launch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-25 21:15:32 +08:00
Parfii-bot	170c850ca0	fix(install): public install via keigit.com (Vultr) — no github needed ... Что меняется: - README.md: git clone instruction → https://keigit.com/keisei/KeiSeiKit-1.0.git (был приватный github, внешний clone падал 404) - .gitmodules: kei-registries submodule → keigit.com/keisei/kei-registries.git (был приватный github, --recurse-submodules падал) - web-install.sh: KEISEI_REPO default → https://keigit.com/keisei/... (был git@github.com:KeiSeiLab/...) - install.sh: NO_EXECUTE check ПЕРЕД check_prereqs, чтобы --no-execute работал без установленных зависимостей. - install/lib-args.sh: новый флаг --skip-prereqs (SKIP_PREREQS) — для CI и dry-run сценариев. - marketplace.json + plugin.json: новые манифесты (version=0.38.0 из git tag) для Claude Code /plugin marketplace add + install. На keigit.com (45.77.41.204, публичный) залиты публичные репо keisei/KeiSeiKit-1.0 + keisei/kei-registries. Anonymous git clone работает. GitHub mirror (KeiSeiLab/*) остаётся приватным как backup.	2026-05-18 11:47:13 +08:00